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FESTO CORP. V. SHOKETSU KINZOKU KOGYO KABUSHIKI
CO.g: A FOG BETWEEN THE BARS
It would be difficult to exaggerate the significance of Festo to the
United States patent system.¼

I. INTRODUCTION
In Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,1
the United States Supreme Court seemingly rescued the doctrine of
equivalents from the near fatal wounds inflicted by the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.2 By rejecting the Federal Circuit’s complete bar
approach, the Supreme Court sought to uphold precedent and restore the
historic balance between the interests of patent owners and prospective
competitors.3 The Court’s holding, however, appears to be middle
g

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. [Festo V], 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
Donald S. Chisum, The Supreme Court’s Festo Decision: Implications for Patent Claim
Scope and Other Issues, available at http://web.lexis.com/xchange/practiceareas/
patent/chisumfesto.pdf (last visited January 31, 2003).
1. Festo V, 535 U.S. at 742.
2. See Benjamin Hsing, Proof of Equivalence After Festo, 725 PLI/PAT 115 (2002) (“In
Festo . . . the Supreme Court reaffirmed the vitality of the doctrine of equivalents, stating that
‘equivalents remain a firmly entrenched part of the settled rights protected by the patent.’”); Jay I.
Alexander, Cabining the Doctrine of Equivalents in Festo: A Historical Perspective on the
Relationship Between the Doctrines of Equivalents and Prosecution History Estoppel, 51 AM. U. L.
REV. 553, 592 (2002) (indicating that Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 created the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, granting it exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals in order to
promote “doctrinal stability” and to “reduce the widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of
the legal doctrine” that then existed in the patent law); Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L.
No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (combining the United States Court of Claims with the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals to create the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); Graver Tank &
Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (indicating the doctrine of
equivalents prevents an accused infringer from avoiding liability for infringement by changing only
minor or insubstantial details of a claimed invention while retaining the invention’s essential
identity); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 496 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the doctrine of equivalents as a
judicially created theory for finding patent infringement when the accused process or product falls
outside the literal scope of the patent claims).
3. See Festo V, 535 U.S. at 739 (stating “the doctrine of equivalents and the rule of
prosecution history estoppel are settled law” and “[f]undamental alterations in these rules risk
destroying the legitimate expectations of inventor in their property”); Alexander, supra note 2, at
598 (stating that the Supreme Court’s Warner-Jenkinson decision “validated the balance between
¼
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ground, shrouded in a fog of unanswered questions, lying somewhere
between the traditional flexible bar approach and the severe complete
bar approach.4 It is unexplored territory, and as one commentator noted:
[T]he Supreme Court’s reversal of the Federal Circuit in Festo did not
restore the flexible bar used by the Federal Circuit in earlier cases. For
the patent practitioner and inventor, the interplay between the doctrine
of equivalents and doctrine of file wrapper estoppel will be decided
through current and future patent litigation.5

This Note examines the interplay between the judicially-created
patent law rules of prosecution history estoppel6 and the doctrine of
the interests of patent owners and his would-be competitors that the Federal Circuit had consistently
implemented since Hughes,” while the Federal Circuit’s Festo decision “skewed the balance well to
the side of the would-be competitors and against patent owners”); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co. [Festo IV], 234 F.3d 558, 569 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (describing the “complete bar”
approach or strict approach as dictating that prosecution history estoppel completely bars the
application of the doctrine of equivalents to a claim element); Id. at 574 (indicating that the “flexible
bar” approach allows application of the doctrine of equivalents and requires a determination of the
exact subject matter surrendered by amendment).
4. See Lawrence B. Ebert, Meet the New Festo: Same as the Old Festo?, available at
http://www.nyipla.org/Bulletin/June2002.pdf (last visited November 2, 2002). See also Kenneth R.
Adamo, Back to the Future: Festo, Equivalents and Presumptive Prosecution History Estoppel, 716
PLI/PAT 147 (2002).
5. 3 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 18:49 n.118 (2d
ed. 1991). It has been noted,
An early indication of the Federal Circuit’s approach to the standard articulated by the
U.S. Supreme Court will likely be found in its treatment of cases remanded to it for
further consideration in light of Festo: Accuscan, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 18 Fed.Appx. 828
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (non-precedential), cert. granted, decision vacated & remanded, [535
U.S. 1109] (June 3, 2002) (mem.); Creo Products Inc. v. Dainippon Screen, et al., 10
Fed.Appx. 921 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (non-precedential), cert. granted, decision vacated &
remanded, 535 U.S. 1109, (June 3, 2002) (mem.); Insituform Technologies v. Cat
Contracting, et al., 99 F.3d 1098, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1602 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. granted,
decision vacated & remanded, 535 U.S. 1108, (June 3, 2002) (mem.); Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc., 249 F.3d 1314, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1671 (Fed. Cir. 2001),
cert. granted, decision vacated & remanded, 535 U.S. 1109, (June 3, 2002) (mem.);
Mycogen Plant Science, et al. v. Monsanto Co., 252 F.3d 1306, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1891
(Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. granted, decision vacated & remanded, 2002 WL 1159483 (June
3, 2002) (mem.); Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., 238 F.3d 1341, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d 1553 (Fed.Cir. 2001), cert. granted, decision vacated & remanded, 535 U.S.
1108, (June 3, 2002) (mem.); PTI Technologies, Inc. v. Pall Corp. Techn., Inc., 259 F.3d
1383, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d 1763 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. granted, decision vacated & remanded,
535 U.S. 1109, (June 3, 2002) (mem.); Semitool, Inc. v. Novellus Systems, Inc., 12
Fed.Appx. 918 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (non-precedential), cert. granted, decision vacated &
remanded, 535 U.S. 1109, (June 3, 2002) (mem.); and, Senior Technologies, Inc. v. R. F.
Technologies, Inc., 13 Fed.Appx. 930 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (non-precedential), cert. granted,
decision vacated & remanded, 535 U.S. 1108, (June 3, 2002) (mem.).
Id.
6. See Festo IV, 234 F.3d at 564 (quoting Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Myaln Pharms., Inc.,
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equivalents.7 Part II explores the development of these rules as well as
their effects and underlying goals.8 Part II also discusses landmark
Supreme Court decisions regarding the doctrine of equivalents and
prosecution history estoppel and how the Federal Circuit has applied
these rules.9 Part III discusses the United States Supreme Court decision
in Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.10
Finally, Part IV analyzes the Festo decision, explains that the
decision will likely increase the cost and complexity of patent
prosecution and litigation, and offers an alternate approach.11
II. BACKGROUND
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to award
inventors exclusive rights to their inventions.12 Acting under the
constitutional grant of power, Congress developed the first Patent Act in
170 F.3d 1373, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (indicating that prosecution history estoppel precludes a
patentee from obtaining under the doctrine of equivalents coverage of subject matter that has been
relinquished during prosecution of its patent application; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1237 (7th ed.
1999) (defining prosecution history estoppel as a doctrine that prevents a patent holder from
invoking the doctrine of equivalents if the holder, during the application process, surrendered
certain claims or interpretations of the invention).
7. See infra Parts II-IV.
8. See infra notes 12-39 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 40-76 and accompanying text. The landmark Supreme Court cases
discussed are Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942) (holding that when
patentee originally claimed the subject matter alleged to be infringed but then narrowed the claim in
response to a rejection, he may not argue that the surrendered territory comprised an unforeseen
equivalent); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) (stating that
the doctrine of equivalents is necessary to protect inventors from copyists who make unimportant
and insubstantial changes to avoid literal infringement of the claim); and Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (holding that prosecution history estoppel may
apply to amendments made for any “substantial reason related to patentability” and patentee has the
burden of proving that an amendment was not made for such a reason).
10. See infra notes 77-118 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.(“The Congress shall have the Power To . . . promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their Respective Writings and Discoveries”). One commentator noted that the
Supreme Court has stated:
The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation. This qualified authority, unlike the
power often exercised in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the English Crown,
is limited to the promotion of advances in the ‘useful arts.’ It was written against the
backdrop of the practices—eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies—of the
Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses which had long
before been enjoyed by the public . . . . The Congress in the exercise of the patent power
may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §2, n.1 (1998) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966)).
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179013 and embodied patent law into United States Code Title 35 in
1952. 14 Title 35 still serves as the basic structure for today’s patent law
and, even through the revisions, is similar in nature and serves the same
basic purposes as the laws set forth at the end of the eighteenth
century.15
By granting inventors’ exclusive rights to their inventions, patent
law aims to promote the public welfare by encouraging advancements in
knowledge.16 Thus, the monopolistic rights given to inventors serve as
an incentive to innovate.17 In exchange for those rights, the patent
system requires the inventor to publicly disclose the invention.18 This
13. See Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109. The Act authorized patents for “any useful
art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or
used” and provided that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General
determined that the invention was “sufficiently useful and important.” CHISUM, supra note 12, §2.
14. See A Brief History of the Patent Law of the United States, available at
http://www.ladas.com/Patents/USPatentHistory.html (last visited October 9, 2002). See also
CHISUM, supra note 12, §§ 2-6. Congress replaced the 1790 Act with the 1793 Act which “omitted
the important determination and authorized patents for ‘any useful art, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement [thereon], not known or used before the
application.’” Id. at § 2 (quoting Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318). A major revision of the
Patent Act in 1836 “created a Patent Office and a system of examination of patent applications for
compliance with the requirement of novelty over the prior art.” Id. at § 3 (referring to the Act of
July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117). The 1870 Act replaced the 1836 Act but retained most of the
1836 Act’s provisions and requirements. Id. (referring to the Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat.
198). The 1952 Act “rearranged existing statutory provisions and stated in statutory form matters
previously recognized only in court decisions and Patent Office practice” and made several changes
and additions, possibly the most significant of which was a statutory provision on nonobviousness.
Id. at § 6.
15. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Crafts Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989) (stating
that “[t]oday’s patent statute is remarkably similar to the law as known to Jefferson in 1793”);
CHISUM, supra note 12, § 2 (stating that the 1790 and 1793 patent statutes introduced fundamental
concepts that remain features of United States patent law today). The four categories of statutory
patentable subject matter expressed in 35 U.S.C. § 101 originated in the 1793 Act. Id. 35 U.S.C. §
101 states that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. §101 (2002) (emphasis added).
“In 1952, Congress replaced ‘art’ with ‘process’ in the four-category definition but emphasized that
the term ‘process’ means process, art, or method.” CHISUM, supra note 12, § 2 at n.4. Invalidity
defenses are another example of an important feature of today’s patent system that originated in the
Eighteenth century statutes. Id. at § 2 (stating “[t]he 1790 and 1793 statutes authorized a patent
owner to sue for infringement but allowed the accused infringer to defend by alleging and proving
the patented invention lacked novelty or was insufficiently disclosed in the inventor’s
specification”).
16. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
17. See Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalent in Patent Law:
Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 674 (1989) (stating that “[a]
patent represents a constitutionally sanctioned, limited monopoly over an invention granted by the
government to an inventor”).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2002). The first two paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. § 112 state:
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disclosure not only specifically identifies the inventor’s protected
property, but it also notifies the public of the invention, thus inviting
others to improve upon the concepts.19 The doctrine of equivalents and
prosecution history estoppel emerged from this inherent balance between
the interests of the inventor and the interests of the public.20
A. Doctrine of Equivalents
A person may directly infringe a patent by “making, using, selling,
or offering for sale” in the United States or “importing into the United
States” the patented invention without the patent owner’s permission.21
To infringe, the accused device must contain elements that are literally
identical to each claimed element of the patented device.22 The doctrine
of equivalents, however, can be used to find patent infringement even
though the accused product falls outside of the literal claim of the
patent.23 Under the doctrine of equivalents, “a product or process that

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by
the inventor of carrying out his invention. The specification shall conclude with one or
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which
the applicant regards as his invention.
Id.
19. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (stating
that disclosure of inventions is one of the primary purposes of the patent system); McClain v.
Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) (stating that requiring the patentee to particularly point out and
distinctly claim his invention is “not only to secure to him all to which is entitled, but to apprise the
public of what is still open to them”); Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150-51 (stating “the federal patent
system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of
new, useful, and non-obvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive right to
practice the invention for a period of years”).
20. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 945 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(Bennett, J., dissenting in part) (1988):
On the one hand, there is the historic right of affording the public fair notice of what the
patentee regards as his claimed invention in order to allow competitors to avoid actions
which infringe that patent and to permit ‘designing around’ the patent. On the other
hand, equally important to the statutory purpose of encouraging progress in the useful
arts, is the policy of affording the patent owner complete and fair protection of what was
invented.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
21. 35 U.S.C. §271(a) (2002). Section 271(a) of Title 35 reads “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during
the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” Id.
22. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
23. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 605.
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does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may
nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the
elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of
the patented invention.”24 In this way, the doctrine protects the patent
holder from copiers who “make unimportant and insubstantial changes
and substitutions in the patent which, though adding nothing, would be
enough to take the copied matter outside the claim, and hence outside
the reach of law.”25 Therefore, the doctrine does not allow one to
“practice a fraud on a patent.”26
The doctrine’s underlying premise is that “the nature of language
makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent
application.”27 The Supreme Court in Winans v. Denmead first adopted
what would become the doctrine of equivalents.28 Since that time, the
doctrine of equivalents has become an accepted aspect of the Supreme
Court’s patent law jurisprudence and was recently reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court.29 The trade-off, however, for increasing the patent’s
24. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 21. From 1950 to 1997, the primary test for determining
whether the accused device was “equivalent” to the patented device was the “function-way-result”
test. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW, § 15.2 (1998).
Under this test, a product is equivalent “‘if it performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result.’” Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608 (quoting
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 230 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
25. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607. See Festo V, 535 U.S. at 733 (2002) (“The doctrine of
equivalents allows the patentee to claim those insubstantial alterations that were not captured in
drafting the original patent claim but which could be created through trivial changes.”).
26. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
27. Festo V, 535 U.S. at 731.
An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of drawings. A
verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the requirements of patent
law. This conversion of machine to words allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot
be satisfactorily filled. Often the invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it.
The dictionary does not always keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things are not
made for the sake of words, but words for things.
Id. (quoting Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
28. See Festo V, 535 U.S. at 732 (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853)). Winans
designed and patented a coal-carrying railroad car in the shape of a cylinder with a conical base.
Winans, 56 U.S. at 332. Due to this shape, the car had significant capacity and stability advantages
over the traditional rectangular shaped railroad car. Id. The defendants built and used a railroad car
that was octagonal with a pyramid base. Id. at 332, 333. The majority held that the patent claim
covered “not only the precise form he had described, but all other forms which embody his
invention.” Id. at 342. Four justices dissented, believing the claim should be literally applied so
that competitors would know its boundaries. Id. at 347.
29. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28 (1997) (stating that if Congress chooses to, it can
abolish the doctrine of equivalents but absent legislative action, the long history of the doctrine
supports adherence to the idea that it does not conflict with the Patent Act). For further cases
tracing that historical development of the doctrine of equivalents, see Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S.
136 (1888); McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. 402 (1857); Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356 (1822);
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claim coverage to adequately protect the inventor’s rights is increased
uncertainty in the scope of the claim.30 The increased uncertainty has
made the courts wary of the doctrine of equivalents’ reach,31 and they
have developed limitations such as prosecution history estoppel to keep
the doctrine in check.32
B. Prosecution History Estoppel
“Prosecution history” or “file wrapper” refers to the documents
filed by the inventor and examiner during the patent acquisition process
that become the publicly available record of those proceedings before
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).33 When a patent
applicant amends or cancels claims in response to a rejection by the

Odioren v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581 (C.C. Mass. 1814).
30. See Festo V, 535 U.S. at 732 (stating that the doctrine of equivalents renders the scope of
patents less certain). See also Anthony Azure, Note, Festo’s Effect on After-Arising Technology and
the Doctrine of Equivalents, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2001) (stating that the doctrine of
equivalents can blur the boundaries of defining what a patent protects).
31. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28-29 (stating “[w]e do, however, share the concern of
the dissenters below that the doctrine of equivalents, as it has come to be applied since Graver Tank,
has taken on a life of its own, unbounded by the patent claims. There can be no denying that the
doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-notice
functions of the statutory claiming requirement”).
32. Id. at 30 (stating that prosecution history estoppel is a legal limitation on the doctrine of
equivalents). One author states that:
[A]pplication of the Doctrine of Equivalents is restrained by three legal tenets that often
play important roles in infringement cases. The first of these is the so-called “All
Elements Rule”: the requirement that each limitation of a claim must be expressed in the
accused [device], either literally or equivalently, for the Doctrine to apply. . . . Next is
the principle of prosecution history estoppel, which precludes a patentee from obtaining
a claim construction before the court that would include subject matter surrendered at the
Patent and Trademark Office during prosecution. . . . Last are the restraints place upon
the Doctrine of Equivalents by the prior art itself. Sound patent policy dictates that
patentees should not be able to obtain a construction of their claims that would reach
technologies that have entered the public domain.
ADELMAN, supra note 24, § 15.3.
33. Id. One commentator noted that “[t]he phrase ‘prosecution history estoppel’ first
appeared in a federal reporter in 1983, see Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351,
1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983)” and “[t]he phrase ‘file wrapper estoppel’ first appeared in a federal reporter
in 1933, see Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co. v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 5 F. Supp. 118, 119
(E.D. Mich. 1933).” T. Whitley Chandler, Prosecution History Estoppel, the Doctrine of
Equivalents, and the Scope of Patents, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465, 466 n.1 (2000). Similar to the
doctrine of equivalents, prosecution history estoppel has its origins in the 19th century where the
Supreme Court appeared to first apply the concept in Leggett v. Avery, 101 U.S. 256 (1879). See
Thomas P. Riley, Note, Prosecution History Estoppel: The Choice Between Public Interests and
Inventor’s Property Rights, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 239, 247 (2001) (stating that Leggett v. Avery
appears to be where the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel established its “Supreme Court
roots”).
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patent examiner, the “file wrapper” is evidence of the changes the
applicant made to satisfy the PTO and obtain the patent.34 Prosecution
history estoppel forbids a patentee from obtaining, through the doctrine
of equivalents, coverage of subject matter that was relinquished during
patent prosecution.35
In this way, prosecution history estoppel limits the doctrine of
equivalents36 and “ensures that [it] remains tied to its underlying
purpose.”37 In addition, prosecution history estoppel serves a notice
function by providing a record that informs the public of the patent
claim’s boundaries.38 Prosecution history estoppel, however, does not
necessarily apply in every instance where the applicant surrenders
subject matter during prosecution.39
C. Landmark Cases in the Application of Doctrine of Equivalents and
Prosecution History Estoppel.
1. Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp.40
Exhibit Supply is described as the leading modern Supreme Court
decision on file wrapper estoppel.41 Plaintiff, Ace Patents Corporation,
owned a patent for a contact switch used in pinball games.42 During
34. See CHISUM, supra note 12, § 18.05
35. 3 MILLS, supra note 5, § 18:50 (quoting Hoganas AB v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 9 F.3d
948, 951-52 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
36. See Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 400-01 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
(stating that the doctrine of equivalents is subservient to file wrapper estoppel and may not include
within its range anything that would vitiate limitations expressed before the Patent Office).
37. Festo V, 535 U.S. at 735.
38. See Festo IV, 234 F.3d at 564-65 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating “[t]he logic of prosecution
history estoppel is that the patentee, during prosecution, has created a record that fairly notifies the
public that the patentee has surrendered the right to claim particular matter as within the reach of the
patent”). When faced with a rejection by the PTO, the patentee’s decision to forgo an appeal and
submit an amended claim is taken as a concession that the invention as patented does not reach as
far as the original clam. Festo V, 535 U.S. at 734.
39. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (holding
that prosecution history estoppel may apply to amendments made for any “substantial reason related
to patentability” and that the patentee has the burden of proving that an amendment was not made
for such a reason). The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit interpretation that a
“substantial reason related to patentability” includes any reason which relates to the statutory
requirements for a patent. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
40. Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942). The Exhibit Supply case
consisted of three separate infringement suits by Ace Patents Corp. against Exhibit Supply
Company, against Genco, Inc., and against Chicago Coin Machine Co. Id. at 127.
41. CHISUM, supra note 12, § 18.02[3].
42. Exhibit Supply Co., 315 U.S. at 127 (indicating that plaintiff is suing for infringement of
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patent prosecution, Ace Patents amended the application to avoid prior
art43 by replacing the phrase “carried by the table,” with the narrower
description “embedded in the table.”44 The Court ruled that this
amendment resulted in prosecution history estoppel and thus barred
plaintiff from invoking the doctrine of equivalents to show infringement
of its patent.45 The Court found that by striking the broader phrase and
substituting “embedded in the table,” the applicant “recognized and
emphasized the difference between the two phrases and proclaimed his
abandonment of all that is embraced in that difference.”46 One
commentator noted “[t]he message of Exhibit Supply is that a court
should not construe a narrow claim of a patent so as to render it
equivalent in scope to a broader claim surrendered during the course of
Patent Office proceedings on the application for a patent.”47
2. Graver Tank & Manufacturing v. Linde Air Products Co.48
The Supreme Court’s confirmation of the doctrine of equivalents in
Graver Tank49 has guided the application of the doctrine for most of the
latter half of the twentieth century.50 In Graver Tank, Linde Air
the Nelson Patent No. 2,109,678 for a “contact switch for ball rolling games”). The court described
the invention as “a resilient switch or circuit closer, so disposed on the board of a game table as to
serve as a target which, when struck by a freely rolling ball, will momentarily close an electrical
circuit.” Id. at 128.
43. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 106 (7th ed. 1999) (defining prior art as “[k]nowledge that is
available, including what would be obvious from it, at a given time to a person of ordinary skill in
an art; esp., the body of previously patented inventions that the patent office or court analyzes
before granting or denying a patent to a comparable invention”).
44. Exhibit Supply Co., 315 U.S. at 136. The examiner rejected the claim because “[i]t is old
in the art to make an electrical contact by flexing a coil spring as shown by the art already cited in
the case.” Id. at 133. The examiner believed that “[i]n order to distinguish over the references
thereof, the applicant’s particular type of contact structure, comprising an extension to the coil
spring adapted to engage an annular contact embedded in the table, must appear in the claims.” Id.
In response, the applicant substituted the phrase “in said circuit and embedded in” for “carried by.”
Id.
45. Id. at 137 (stating “[i]t follows that what the patentee, by a strict construction of the
claims, has disclaimed – conductors which are carried by the table but not embedded in it – cannot
now be regained by recourse to the doctrine of equivalents, which at most operates, by liberal
construction, to secure to the inventor the full benefits, not disclaimed, of the claims allowed”).
46. Exhibit Supply, 315 U.S. at 136 (stating “[t]he applicant restricted his claim to those
combinations in which the conductor means, though carried on the table, is also embedded in it”).
47. CHISUM, supra note 12, § 18.02[3].
48. Graver Tank & Manufacturing v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
49. Id.
50. See ADELMAN, supra note 24, § 15.2; Richard L. Wynne, Jr., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chemical Co.: How Can the Federal Circuit Control the Doctrine of Equivalents
Following the Supreme Court’s Refusal to Set the Standard?, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 425, 425-26 (1997)
(stating that since 1950 the test from Graver Tank has been the primary analysis applied for
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Products owned a patent claiming a welding flux composed essentially
of alkaline earth metal silicates and calcium fluoride.51 Linde Air
Products filed an infringement suit against a competitor for selling a
similar welding flux made of a silicate that was not an alkaline earth
metal.52
Nevertheless, the majority found infringement53 and noted that both
prior art54 and specialists in the field indicated that manganese silicate
could be used in welding in the same manner as magnesium silicate.55
The Court further noted that the record contained no evidence of
determining infringement under the doctrine of equivalents).
51. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 610. Linde Air Products owns the Jones Patent which claims an
electric welding process and fluxes used in the process. Id. at 606. Specifically, Linde’s product,
Unionmelt Grade 20, uses calcium silicate and magnesium silicate as the alkaline earth metal
silicates. Id. at 610.
52. Id. (indicating that the accused infringing composition, Lincolnweld 660, used a silicate of
manganese which is not an alkaline earth metal). “In all other respects, the two compositions are
alike. The mechanical methods in which these compositions are employed is similar. They are
identical in operation and produce the same kind and quality of weld.” Id.
53. But see Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 26 n.3 (1997)
(noting that Graver Tank was decided over Justice Black’s strong dissent). A commentator notes
that Justice Black, in his dissent:
[E]ndorsed the majority’s view that the doctrine of equivalents was intended to prevent
“fraud” and “piracy,” but argued that there was no such “malevolence” even alleged
against the infringer. Further, the dissent expressed concern that the Court’s liberal
application of the doctrine of equivalents in circumstances that did not involve any
wrongdoing by the putative infringer created potential dangers. Specifically, patentees
could use the doctrine of equivalents to broaden a patent claim, treating that claim “‘like
a nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction.’” The dissent argued
that Congress had provided two safeguards: patent claims must be specific, and the
reissue process could be used to assist patentees who had failed to claim adequate scope
of protection. In addition, the dissent noted that the district court had explicitly refused
to go beyond the specification of the claimed invention, which had disclosed that
manganese was an appropriate substitute for alkaline earth metals. While it was true that
some of the original patent claims covered manganese silicate, these claims were found
to be invalid because they were too broad. Finally, the dissent pointed out that the patent
holder’s failure to claim manganese was probably intentional, because the patent holder
had reason to fear that such claims would have been denied in light if the use of
manganese in prior expired art.
Adelman & Francione, supra note 17, at 702-03.
54. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 611 (stating that the Miller patent, No. 1,754,566, taught the use
of manganese silicate in welding flux and the Armor Patent, No. 1,467,825, described manganese in
a welding composition).
55. Id. at 610 (stating that chemists who were familiar with the two fluxes testified that
manganese and magnesium were similar in many of their reactions); But see ADELMAN, supra note
24 (stating that one commentator noted that “manganese and magnesium are both metal and start
with an ‘m’ and have at least three syllables, but otherwise are so different structurally that they are
in different categories on the periodic table.” (citing Harold C. Wegner, Equitable Equivalents:
Weighing the Equities to Determine Patent Infringement in Biotechnology and Other Emerging
Technologies, 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 28-29 n.100 (1992)).
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independent research or development on the part of the alleged
infringer.56 The majority then discussed some of the considerations to
be used when applying the doctrine of equivalents.57 In addition, the
majority’s opinion set forth the famous “function–way–result” test,58
which stood as the exclusive standard for determining equivalency in the
United States until 1995.59
3. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.60
Warner-Jenkinson involved a patent for an ultrafiltration process
for purifying dyes.61 During patent prosecution, Hilton Davis added the
phrase “at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0” to avoid prior art.62
56. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 611 (1950).
57. Id. at 609. The Supreme Court stated:
What constitutes equivalency must be determined against the context of the patent, the
prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case. Equivalence, in the patent law, is
not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be considered in a vacuum. It
does not require complete identity for every purpose and in every respect. In
determining equivalents, things equal to the same thing may not be equal to each other
and, by the same token, things for most purposes different may sometimes be
equivalents. Consideration must be given to the purpose for which an ingredient is used
in a patent, the qualities it has when combined with the other ingredients, and the
function which it is intended to perform. An important factor is whether the persons
reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient
not contained in the patent with one that was.
Id.
58. Id. at 608 (holding that a patentee may invoke [doctrine of equivalents] to proceed against
the producer of a device if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way
to obtain the same result).
59. See ADELMAN, supra note 24, at 900 (stating the tripartite test of Graver Tank stood as
the exclusive United States standard of equivalency for nearly a half-century). But see id. stating
that
[E]xperience did not refine [Graver’s tripartite standard], but instead demonstrated that
its extraordinary vagueness was of scant use in resolving actual infringement cases.
Litigants places vastly different meanings upon the terms ‘function,’ ‘way,’ and ‘result,’
with patentees reading these terms broadly and accused infringers narrowly. Often this
standard simply collapsed into a test of ‘way’: if the accused technology did not perform
the same function to achieve the same result, it ordinarily would not be subject of a
patent infringement suit at all . . . . This experience led to considerable unrest at the
Federal Circuit, ultimately culminating in the court’s en banc Hilton Davis opinion . . . .
Id. In 1995, the Federal Circuit introduced the “insubstantial differences” test for equivalency.
Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson, 62 F.3d 1512, 1521-22 (Fed. Cir. 1995). This test
looks beyond just function-way-result, and asks whether substantial differences exist between the
accused process or device and the patented process or device. Id.
60. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
61. Id. at 21. It is necessary to remove impurities from dyes. Id. Hilton Davis’s process
“filters impure dye through a porous membrane at certain pressures and pH levels.” Id. at 21-22.
See id. at 22 n.1 (defining and explaining pH).
62. Id. at 22. The “Booth” patent disclosed an ultrafiltration process which operated at a pH
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Warner-Jenkinson subsequently developed an ultrafiltration process
operating at a pH of 5.0.63 In its opinion, the Supreme Court confirmed
the doctrine of equivalents to be “good law” by rejecting WarnerJenkinson’s argument that the doctrine is inconsistent with the 1952
revision of the Patent Act.64 The Supreme Court, however, expressed
concerns over the broad application of the doctrine of equivalents since
Graver Tank.65 Addressing this concern, the Court confirmed that
prosecution history estoppel was still available to limit the doctrine of
equivalents.66 Yet, the Court would not go so far as to support WarnerJenkinson’s argument that “the reason for an amendment during patent
prosecution is irrelevant to any subsequent estoppel.”67 The Court stated
of greater than 9.0. Id. Hilton Davis offered no explanation as to why the 6.0 pH limitation was
added but denied Warner-Jenkinson’s contention that the process was not shown to work below a
pH of 6.0 due to foaming problem. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 22 n.2.
63. Id. at 23. Warner-Jenkinson developed the 5.0 pH process in 1986 and did not learn of
Hilton Davis patent until after commercial use of its 5.0 pH process. Id.
64. See id. at 28. Warner-Jenkinson argued:
(1) The doctrine of equivalents is inconsistent with the statutory requirement that a
patentee specially “claim” the invention covered by the patent, § 112; (2) the doctrine
circumvents the patent reissue process— designed to correct mistakes in drafting or the
like—and avoids the express limitations on that process, §§ 251-252; (3) the doctrine is
inconsistent with the primacy of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in setting the
scope of a patent through the patent prosecution process; and (4) the doctrine was
implicitly rejected as a general matter by Congress’ specific and limited inclusion of the
doctrine in one section regarding “means” claiming, § 112, ¶6.
Id. at 25-26. The Court noted that the first three arguments where made and rejected in Graver
Tank regarding the 1870 Patent Act. Id. at 26. Court stated that the 1952 Act was not materially
different than the 1870 Act concerning claiming, reissue, and the role of the PTO. WarnerJenkinson, 520 U.S. at 25-26. In addition, the Court stated that, in the context of infringement, the
Pre-1952 precedent survived the enactment of the 1952 Act. Id. Regarding Warner-Jenkinson’s
fourth argument, the court stated that “§ 112, ¶6[,] was enacted as a targeted cure to a specific
problem” and the reference to equivalents in the section “appears to be no more than a prophylactic
against potential side effects of that cure . . . .” Id. at 28. The court stated that Congress could have
responded to the 1950 Graver Tank holding and legislated the doctrine of equivalents out of
existence in the 1952 Act, but Congress did not. Id.
65. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950). See WarnerJenkinson, 520 U.S at 28-29. The Court stated that:
[T]he doctrine of equivalents, as it has come to be applied since Graver Tank, has taken
on a life of its own, unbounded by the patent claims. There can be no denying that the
doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public
notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement.
Id.
66. Id. at 30 (stating “We can readily agree with petitioner that Graver Tank did not dispose
of prosecution history estoppel as a legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents”).
67. Id. at 30. The Court noted that prior Supreme Court cases have considered prosecution
history estoppel with amendments made to avoid prior art. Id. However, the PTO may request a
change to the claim language for reasons not related to prior art and thus not intended to limit
equivalents. Id. at 32. Supreme Court precedent has “consistently applied prosecution history
estoppel only where claims have been amended for a limited set of reasons.” Id. Since the PTO
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that the better rule would allow the patent holder to demonstrate that an
amendment was made for a purpose unrelated to patentability.68 If,
however, the patent holder is unable to establish such a purpose, the
court should presume that prosecution history estoppel applies.69 In its
opinion, the Supreme Court did not define what constitutes a “reason
related to patentability,” leaving it to the lower courts to interpret.70
Since the Federal Circuit had not applied this new rule, the Supreme
Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for
further proceedings.71
D. Federal Circuit’s Application of the Doctrines
The appropriate use of the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution
history estoppel has been heavily debated over the years.72 The
may have relied upon a flexible rule of estoppel when deciding to ask for a change, such a
substantial change to the law “could very well subvert the various balances the PTO sought to strike
when issuing the numerous patents which have not yet expired and which would be affected by our
decision.” Id. at 32 n.6.
68. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997). Patent
claims serve both a defintional and a notice function, which are best served by placing the burden
on the patent holder to establish the reason an amendment was made during patent prosecution. Id.
69. Id. This rule “gives proper deference to the role of claims in defining invention and
providing public notice, and to the primacy of the PTO in ensuring that the claims allowed cover the
subject matter that is properly patentable in a proffered patent application.” Id. at 33-34.
70. Festo V, 535 U.S. at 735 (stating that “[w]hile we made clear [in Warner-Jenkinson] that
estoppel applies to amendments made for a ‘substantial reason related to patentability,’ we did not
purport to define that term or to catalog every reason that might raise estoppel”) (internal citations
omitted). See id. at 726 (stating that certiorari was granted, in part, to answer the question of
whether estoppel applies to every amendment made to satisfy the requirements of the Patent Act).
71. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 41 (stating that Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
did not consider all of the requirements related to prosecution history estoppel and the preservation
of some meaning for each element in a claim).
72. See, e.g., Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent
Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (1989); Alexander, supra
note 2, at 553; Ted Apple, Enablement Estoppel: Should Prosecution History Estoppel Arise when
Claims are Amended to Overcome Enablement Rejections?, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 107 (1997); Glenn K. Beaton, File Wrapper Estoppel and the Federal Circuit, 68 DENV.
U. L. REV. 283 (1991); T. Whitley Chandler, Prosecution History Estoppel, the Doctrine of
Equivalents, and the Scope of Patents, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465 (2000); Donald S. Chisum, The
Scope of Protection for Patents After the Supreme Court’s Warner-Jenkinson Decision: The Fair
Protection-Certainty Conundrum, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1998); Peter
Corcoran, The Scope of Claim Amendments, Prosecution History Estoppel, and the Doctrine of
Equivalents After Festo VI, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159 (2001); Paul C. Craane, At the
Boundaries of Law and Equity: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 105 (1992); Kurt F. James, Comment, Patent Claims and
Prosecution History Estoppel in the Federal Circuit, 53 MO. L. REV. 497 (1988); Thomas P. Riley,
Prosecution History Estoppel: The Choice Between Public Interests and Inventor’s Property Rights,
36 VAL. U. L. REV. 239 (2001); John W. Schlicher, The Law, History, and Policy of Prosecution
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existence of a variety of opinions on the proper application of the
doctrines is evidenced by the Federal Circuit’s en banc Festo decision
which noted “two divergent lines of authority concerning the proper
scope of equivalents for claims subject to estoppel.”73 One commentator
remarked that “most Federal Circuit panel decisions from 1984 to 1997
followed the flexible approach, which had been initiated in 1983 by the
Hughes Aircraft decision.”74 In contrast to the flexible approach,
Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co.75 has been noted as establishing a line of

History Estoppel in Patent Actions in the U.S. Supreme Court—Implications for Festo (Part I), 84 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 581 (2002); Richard L. Wynne, Jr., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chemical Co.: How Can the Federal Circuit Control the Doctrine of Equivalents
Following the Supreme Court’s Refusal to Set the Standard?, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 425 (1997);
Christina Y. Lai, Note, A Dysfunctional Formalism: How Modern Courts are Undermining the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 44 UCLA L. REV. 2031 (1997); Paul J. Otterstedt, Note, Unwrapping File
Wrapper Estoppel in the Federal Circuit: A New Economic Policy Approach, 67 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 405 (1993); Note, Doctrine of Equivalents Revalued, 19 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 491 (1951);
Note, To Bar or Not to Bar: Prosecution History Estoppel After Warner-Jenkinson, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 2330 (1998).
73. Festo IV, 234 F. 3d at 571-74 (characterizing and supporting with commentator notes, the
decisions in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983) and Kinzenbaw v.
Deere & Co., 741 F.2d. 383 (Fed.Cir. 1984), as developing a flexible bar and complete bar line of
cases, respectively). But see Festo IV, 234 F.3d at 610 (Michels, J., dissenting) (objecting to the
characterization of Kinzenbaw as establishing a divergent line of authority) (quoting Douglas A.
Strawbridge et al., Area Summary, Patent Law Developments in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit During 1986, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 861, 887 (1987)). For Justice Michels, the
“line” which consists of only two cases (Kinzenbaw and Prodyne Enterpries v. Julie Pomerantz,
743 F.2d 1581 (1984)) does not advocate the complete bar approach—the cases “simply stand for
the rule that courts will not undertake speculative inquiry into whether a claim amendment was
necessary.” Festo IV, 234 F.3d at 610 (quoting Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 389 and Prodyne, 743 F.2d
at 1583). Furthermore, Justice Michels believed that in both cases, the court did not substitute a
complete bar for the flexible approach; the court simply looked at the scope of the subject matter
surrendered and found that the surrender covered the accused subject matter. Id.
74. CHISUM, supra note 12, § 18.05[3][b]i]. See also id. at § 18.05[3][b][ii] (stating “[t]he
germinal decision for the flexible approach was Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d
1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983), in which the court rejected the view that any amendment of claims created a
file wrapper estoppel and limited the patentee to consideration of literal infringement alone. The
court rejected the view of some courts that “virtually any amendment of the claims creates a ‘file
wrapper estoppel’ effective to bar all resort to the doctrine of equivalents, and to confine patentee
‘strictly to the letter of the limited claims granted’”). For Federal Circuit court cases following the
flexible approach since Hughes, see e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470 (Fed.
Cir. 1998); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Modine Mfg. Co. v.
U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n., 75 F.3d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Dixie USA, Inc. v. Infab Corp., 927 F.2d
584 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Black & Decker Inc. v. Hoover Serv. Ctr., 886 F.2d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
Envtl. Instruments, Inc. v. Sutron Corp., 877 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1989); LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. U.S.
Int’l Trade Comm’n., 867 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc.,
872 F.2d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1989). For explanation of flexible bar approach and complete or strict bar
approach, see supra note 3.
75. Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co. 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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authority in support of a strict approach to estoppel.76 In Kinzenbaw, the
Federal Circuit held that estoppel barred application of the doctrine of
equivalents as the court declined “to undertake a speculative inquiry
whether, if . . . [the inventor] had made only that narrowing limitation in
his claim, the examiner nevertheless would have allowed it.”77
III. STATEMENT OF CASE
A. Statement of the Facts
Festo Corporation held two patents, the Stoll patent78 and the
Carroll patent,79 that claim devices described as magnetically coupled
rodless cylinders.80 During the initial prosecution hearing, the patent
examiner rejected the application under 35 U.S.C. §112.81 Festo
76. Festo IV, 234 F.3d at 573 (citing CHISUM, supra note 12, § 18.05[3][b]) (noting that
Professor Chisum observed that Kinzenbaw established a line that followed the strict approach).
77. Id. (citing Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d. 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
78. See U.S. Patent No. 4,354,125 (issued October 12, 1982) available at
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/srchnum.htm. The Stoll patent was filed as the U.S. counterpart of a
German patent application. Festo IV, 234 F.3d at 582. Stoll filed the U.S. patent application on May
28, 1980 and the patent was issued on October 12, 1982. Id. at 579.
79. See U.S. Patent No. 3,779,401 (issued December 18, 1973) available at
http://patft.mg1uspto.gov. Application of the Carroll patent was filed on February 17, 1972 and the
patent was issued on December 18, 1973. Festo IV, 234 F.3d at 580.
80. Id. at 579. This device consists of a cylindrical tube, a piston located on the inside the
tube and a sleeve fitted around the outside of the tube. See id. Fluid pressure is used to move the
piston along the inside of the tube. Id. Magnets are mounted on the piston and the outer sleeve so
that the sleeve follows the movement of the piston due to the magnetic attraction between the
magnets. Id. In this way, the sleeve can be used to move other objects that themselves are
physically attached or coupled to the sleeve. Id. “The device has many industrial uses and has been
employed in machinery as diverse as sewing equipment and the Thunder Mountain ride at Disney
World.” Festo V, 535 U.S. at 728.
81. Festo IV, 234 F.3d at 583. 35 U.S.C. § 112 states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by
the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject mater which the applicant regards as his invention
A claim may be written in independent or, if the nature of the case admits, in dependent
or multiple dependent form.
Subject to the following paragraph, a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference
to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter
claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all
the limitations of the claim to which it refers.
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amended the application by more specifically describing the location of
the piston’s sealing rings and by adding the limitation that the sleeve was
to be made of a magnetizable material.82 The examiner accepted the
amended claims.83
Festo requested reexamination of the Carroll patent on March 18,
1988 due to a possible prior reference not disclosed during initial
prosecution of the patent.84 During reexamination, Festo amended the

A claim in multiple dependent form shall contain a reference, in the alternative only, to
more than one claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the
subject matter claimed. A multiple dependent claim shall not serve as a basis for any
other multiple dependent claim. A multiple dependent claim shall be construed to
incorporate by reference all the limitations of the particular claims in relation to which it
is being construed.
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or a step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in
support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2002). The patent examiner rejected all 12 patent claims “under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
¶ 1, because the ‘exact method of operation is unclear. Is [the] device a true motor or magnetic
clutch?’” Festo IV, 234 F.3d at 583; see 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2002). In addition, the examiner rejected
claims 4-12 “under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2, because they were ‘improperly multiply dependent.’” 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2002).
82. Festo IV, 234 F.3d at 583. Festo cancelled claims 4 and 8 and amended claim 1. Id. In
the amendment, Festo replaced the phrase “‘sealing means at each end’ of the piston with ‘first
sealing rings located axially outside said guide rings.’” Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co [Festo III], 172 F.3d 1361, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In addition, Festo “replaced
the phrase ‘hollow cylindrical assembly’ . . . with the phrase ‘a cylindrical sleeve made of a
magnetizable material and encircles said tube.’” Id. In the amended application, Festo also cited
two German patents (No. 2,737,924 and No. 1,982,379) but argued that the device in the amended
application was distinguished over the two German patents as “it is clear that neither of theses two
references discloses the use of structure preventing the interference by impurities located inside the
tube and on the outside of the tube while the arrangement is moved along the tube.” Festo IV, 234
F.3d at 583.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 584. The Patent Act specifically allows for reexamination of a patent. See 35
U.S.C. §§ 301-18 (2002). One court stated:
The reexamination statute’s purpose is to correct errors made by the government, to
remedy defective governmental (not private) action, and if need be to remove patent that
never should have been granted. . . . A defectively examined and therefore erroneously
granted patent must yield to the reasonable Congressional purpose of facilitating the
correction of governmental mistakes.
Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604, aff’d on reh’g, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Benefits of reexamination include resolving validity disputes more quickly and less expensively
than litigation, providing courts with the benefit of the PTO’s expertise concerning prior art not
originally part of the record, and strengthening the confidence in the validity of patents whose
validity may be clouded due to the existence of possibly pertinent prior art that was not previously
considered by the PTO. Id. at 602. Festo disclosed German Patent No. 1,982,379 as the possible
prior reference not previously considered. Festo IV, 234 F.3d at 584. Festo stated that the PTO
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patent claim to “more clearly and specifically define the device,”
including specifying a pair of sealing rings on the piston.85 The
examiner found that the amended patent was distinguished from the
prior art, and approved it.86
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (hereinafter SMC) entered
the market with a similar device.87 SMC’s device differed from Festo’s
in that it used an outer sleeve made of a non-magnetic aluminum alloy,
and instead of the four ring combination (a guide ring and seal ring at
each end of the piston) utilized in Festo’s device, it used a three ring
combination (a guide ring at each end but a seal ring at only one end).88
B. Procedural History
Festo brought suit in the United States District Court of
Massachusetts claiming patent infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.89 The District Court granted Festo’s motion for summary
judgment concerning infringement of the Carroll Patent, and the jury
found that the SMC device infringed the Stoll patent.90 On appeal, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court’s findings and rejected
SMC’s contention that prosecution history estoppel should bar
recovery.91 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but vacated and
remanded in light of its decision in Warner-Jenkinson.92
“may find the German patent, in combination with the other references which were cited during
prosecution of the Carroll patent[,] . . . to disclose several of the primary structural features of the
device defined by Claim 1.” Id.
85. Id. Festo canceled claim 1, amended claims 3 and 5, and added claim 9 which recited “a
pair of resilient sealing rings situated near opposite axial ends of the central mounting member and
engaging the cylinder to effect a fluid-tight seal therewith.” Id.
86. Id. The examiner stated claims 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9 are deemed allowable over the prior art of
record, including German Patent No. 1,982,379, because “the prior art does not teach or render
obvious the claimed combination which includes the plurality of magnets, end members, and
cushion members in the claimed relationship.” Id.
87. Festo IV, 234 F.3d at 582.
88. Id. In contrast to the SMC device, the Stoll patent specifically claims a sleeve made from
a magnetizable material and both the Stoll and Carroll patents claim a pair of sealing rings. See
supra notes 132 and 165.
89. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. [Festo I], No. 88-1814-PBS
(D.Mass. Feb. 3, 1994).
90. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. [Festo II], 72 F.3d 857, 861-62
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating the district court noted that SMC did not offer any evidence to refute the
assertion that its single sealing ring performed substantially the same function, in substantially the
same way, with the same result as the two pair of sealing rings on the Festo device).
91. Id. at 868. The Federal Circuit stated that it was an not error of law for the trial judge to
hold that Festo was not estopped to argue equivalence between the SMC aluminum sleeve and its
magnetizable sleeve. Id. at 864.
92. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997). For the
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On remand, the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of
infringement of the Carroll patent holding that Festo was not barred by
prosecution history estoppel from applying the doctrine of equivalents to
the sealing rings.93 However, the Federal Circuit vacated the judgment
of infringement of the Stoll patent and remanded the issue for
redetermination.94 SMC petitioned the Federal Circuit for a rehearing en
banc95 which the Federal Circuit granted, thus vacating the earlier
judgment.96 The en banc court concluded that prosecution history
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari, see Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. v. Festo Corp., 520
U.S. 1111 (1997). The sequence of events (grant, vacate and remand) followed by the Supreme
Court is called a GVR and occurs when:
[i]ntervening developments, or recent developments that we have reason to believe the
court below did not fully consider, reveal a reasonable probability that the decision
below rests upon a premise that the lower court would reject if given the opportunity for
further consideration, and where it appears that such a redetermination may determine
the ultimate outcome of the litigation,. . . .
Festo III, 172 F.3d at 1365 (quoting Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996)).
93. See Festo III, 172 F.3d at 1374. The Federal Circuit noted that Festo’s amendment which
added the sealing rings to the patent claim was made voluntarily and was not in response to a
relevant rejection by the examiner. Id. The court further noted that the sealing rings were not at
issue or argued during reexamination and were not stated as a reason for granting reexamination.
Id. SMC’s argument that any claim limitation added by amendment automatically raises estoppel is
not supported by the Supreme Court’s holding in Warner-Jenkinson. Id. “[A] voluntary
amendment, not accompanied by argument or representations relevant to patentability, does not
necessarily generate an estoppel, any more than do claims as originally filed.” Id.
94. Id. at 1381. Accompanying its amendment, Festo cited two German patents and argued
its device was distinguished over them. See supra note 82. Festo’s argument referred to the wiping
function of the sealing rings and thus raises a question of whether the amendment was made for
reasons related to patentability. Festo III, 172 F.3d at 1380.
95. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 546 (7th ed. 1999) (defining en banc (or in banc) as “with all
judges present and participating; in full court”).
96. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co, 187 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir.
1999). The order for rehearing noted the following five questions to be addressed in the briefs:
1. For purposes of determining whether an amendment to a claim creates prosecution
history estoppel, is “a substantial reason related to patentability,” limited to those
amendments made to overcome prior art under § 102 and § 103, or does “patentability”
mean any reason affecting the issuance of a patent?
2. Under Warner-Jenkinson, should a “voluntary” claim amendment—one not required
by the examiner or made in response to a rejection by an examiner for a stated reason—
create prosecution history estoppel?
3. If a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel, under Warner-Jenkinson
what range of equivalents, if any, is available under the doctrine of equivalents for claim
element so amended?
4. When “no explanation [for a claim amendment] is established,” thus invoking the
presumption of prosecution history estoppel under Warner-Jenkinson, what range of
equivalents, if any, is available under the doctrine of equivalents for the claim elements
so amended?
5. Would a judgment of infringement in this case violate Warner-Jenkinson’s
requirement that the application of the doctrine of equivalents “is not allowed such broad
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estoppel barred Festo from using the doctrine of equivalents.97
Therefore, SMC’s device did not infringe Festo’s patents.98 In doing so,
the Federal Circuit held “a ‘substantial reason related to patentability’ is
not limited to overcoming or avoiding prior art, but instead includes any
reason which relates to the statutory requirements for a patent.”99
Furthermore, the court endorsed the strict approach by holding that when
an amendment creates prosecution history estoppel with regard to a
claim element there is no range of equivalents available for the amended
claim element.100 The majority’s holdings sparked six Federal Circuit
judges to write separate opinions.101
play as to eliminate [an] element in its entirety[,]” In other words, would such a
judgment of infringement, post Warner-Jenkinson, violate the “all elements” rule?
Id. at 1381-82. (internal citations omitted).
97. Festo IV, 234 F.3d at 591 (stating that Festo did not establish explanations for the
amendments unrelated to patentability and that the amendments, therefore, gave rise to prosecution
history estopple.)
98. Id.
99. Id. at 566. Though Warner-Jenkinson focused on amendments made to overcome prior
art, there are numerous other statutory requirements that must be met before a patent can be issued
and which can render a patent invalid. Id. The patent must satisfy the requirements of novelty, (35
U.S.C. § 102), nonobviousness, (35 U.S.C. § 103), utility and patentable subject matter, (35 U.S.C.
§ 101), description, enablement, and best mode, (35 U.S.C. § 112), ¶1, and the claims must set forth
the subject matter the applicant regards as his invention and must particularly point out and
distinctly define the invention, (35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶2). Id. The majority believed that the functions
of prosecution history estoppel cannot be fully served if the doctrine is limited only to amendments
made to overcome prior art, but the majority does not elaborate its reasoning. Id. at 567. The
majority believed the question of available scope of equivalents was not answered in WarnerJenkinson but not inconsistent with its holdings. Id.
100. Festo IV, 234 F.3d at 569. The majority believed that the issue “of the scope of
equivalents available when prosecution history applies to a claim element has not been directly
addressed by the Supreme Court, at least in circumstances where the claim was amended for a
known patentability reason.” Id. The majority stated that Warner-Jenkinson focused on
unexplained amendments. Id. In the majority’s view, the flexible bar approach was unworkable
and “pose[d] a direct obstacle to the realization of important objectives” such as preserving the
notice function, giving effect to a narrowing amendment’s operation as a disclaimer of subject
matter, and promoting certainty. Id. at 575. In contrast, the majority believed the complete bar
would enforce the disclaimer effect, would best serve the notice and definitional function of claims,
and would eliminate the public’s need to speculate as to the subject matter surrendered by an
amendment. Id. at 575-76. In the majority’s view, the increased certainty of the complete bar
would stimulate investment and design-arounds because risk of infringement will be easier to
determine. Id. at 577.
101. See Festo IV, 234 F.3d at 591-93 (Plager, J., concurring) (describing the complete bar as
the “second best solution to an unsatisfactory situation” and arguing that the better solution would
be “to declare the doctrine of equivalents . . . to have its roots firmly in equity, and to acknowledge
that when and in what circumstances it applies is a question of equitable law, for which judges bear
the responsibility”); Id. at 595-98 (Lourie, J., concurring) (stating that the complete bar is in the best
interest of patent law and rejecting the various arguments of the flexible bar proponents); Id. at 598
(Michel, J., concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part) (disagreeing with the complete bar approach
because it directly contradicts a U.S. Supreme Court holding, it undermines the legal standards the
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C. The U.S. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and considered two
questions.102 The first question addressed the types of amendments that
could lead to prosecution history estoppel.103 The Court reiterated its
Warner-Jenkinson holding that although estoppel does not arise in every
instance when an application is amended, it does apply after an
amendment is made for a “substantial reason related to patentability.”104
The Court went on to affirm the Federal Circuit’s holding that “an
amendment made for a substantial reason related to patentability”
included narrowing amendments made to satisfy any requirement of the
Patent Act.105 In the Court’s view, “a patentee who narrows a claim as a
Supreme Court articulated in seven other cases, it effectively strips most patentees of their rights to
asset infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, and it creates easy exploitation for would-be
copyists); Id. at 619 (Rader, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (arguing that the complete
bar defeats the doctrine of equivalents ability to accommodate after-arising technology; a result not
anticipated nor justified by the majority’s reasons for implementing the complete bar); Id. at 620
(Linn, J., concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part) (arguing that the complete bar “increases the cost
and complexity of patent prosecution[,] . . . places greater emphasis on literary skill than on an
inventor’s ingenuity, gives unscrupulous copyists a free ride, and changes the rules under which
prosecution strategies were formulated for thousands of extant patents no longer subject to
correction”); Id. at 630-42 (Newman, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (arguing that the
complete bar conflicts with the Supreme Court Warner-Jenkinson decision and inappropriately
disrupts the “balance between inventors and imitators”). Two additional holdings of the majority in
Festo IV were (i) Voluntary amendments are treated the same as other amendments and thus can
give rise to prosecution history estoppel, see id. at 568, and (ii) no range of equivalents is available
for the amended claim element when no explanation for a claim amendment is established. Id. at
578. The fifth question asking whether a judgment of infringement in this case would violate the
all-elements rule was briefed but the court did not believe an answer was required to resolve the
controversy. Id.
102. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. [Festo V], 535 U.S. 722, 726
(2002). See Patrick J. Flinn, Whither Festo?, 669 PLI/PAT 323, 341 (2001) (indicating that not all
of the holdings from Federal Circuit are implicated by certiorari). “The order granting the writ of
certiorari does not specify the issues to be addressed; it merely granted Festo’s petition.” Id. Festo’s
petition identified only two issues. Id.
103. Festo V, 535 U.S. at 735. Festo Corp. argued that prosecution history estoppel should
only arise when the amendments are made with the intention to narrow the subject matter of the
patented invention, for example, when avoiding prior art. Id. Festo Corp. further argued that
prosecution history should not occur when the amendments are made to comply with form
requirements, for instance, when complying with 35 U.S.C. § 112. Id. See generally supra note 81
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2002)).
104. Festo V, 535 U.S. at 735. The Supreme Court acknowledged that in Warner-Jenkinson,
the Court did not define “substantial reason related to patentability” or list every reason that may
give rise to prosecution history estoppel. Id. (quoting Warner –Jenkinson v. Davis, 520 U.S. 17, 33
(1997)). The Court also stated “that even if the amendment’s purpose were unrelated to
patentability, the court might consider whether it was the kind of reason that nonetheless might
require resort to the estoppel doctrine.” Id., 535 U.S. at 735.
105. Id. The Supreme Court acknowledged that prosecution history estoppel has most often
been discussed “in the context of amendments made to avoid prior art” but did not believe that
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condition for obtaining a patent disavows his claim to the broader
subject matter, whether the amendment was made to avoid prior art or to
comply with §112.”106
The second question before the Court concerned whether estoppel
bars “the inventor from asserting infringement against any equivalent to
the narrowed element,” or whether some equivalents may still be
infringed.107 On this question, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s
complete bar approach,108 stating that a complete bar is inconsistent
with the purpose of applying estoppel.109 An amendment establishes an
inference that the patent “does not extend as far as the original claim,”
but the linguistic challenges of describing an invention still exist after
the amendment.110
The Supreme Court also noted that precedent supports the flexible
bar approach and the approach is respectful of the PTO’s practice.111
amendments made for other reasons would not give rise to estoppel as well. Id.
106. Id. at 736-37. The Supreme Court stated
Estoppel arises when an amendment is made to secure the patent and the amendment
narrows the patent’s scope. If a §112 amendment is truly cosmetic, when it would not
narrow the patent’s scope or raise an estoppel. On the other hand, if a §112 amendment
is necessary and narrows the patent’s scope – even if only for the purpose of better
description – estoppel may apply. . . . We must regard the patentee as having conceded
an inability to claim broader subject matter or at least as having abandoned his right to
appeal a rejection. In either case estoppel may apply.
Id.
107. Festo V, 535 U.S. at 737 (emphasis added).
108. Id. The Federal Circuit had decided, based on their experience, that the traditional
flexible bar approach was unworkable because it results in excessive uncertainty and burdens
legitimate innovation. Id.
109. Id. In the Court’s view, the purpose of applying estoppel is “to hold inventors to the
representations made during the application process and to the inferences that may be reasonably
drawn from the amendment.” Id. at 737-38. Application of prosecution history estoppel requires an
examination of the subject matter surrendered. Id. Avoiding this inquiry by establishing a bright
line rule such as the complete bar is inconsistent with this purpose. Id.
110. Festo V, 535 U.S. at 738. The court stated that even though the amended claim is deemed
to not extend as far as the original:
[I]t does not follow, however, that the amended claim becomes so perfect in its
description that no one could devise an equivalent. After amendment, as before,
language remains an imperfect fit for invention. The narrowing amendment may
demonstrate what the claim is not; but it may still fail to capture precisely what the claim
is. . . . The amendment does not show that the inventor suddenly had more foresight in
the drafting of claims than an inventor whose application was granted without
amendments having been submitted. It shows only that he was familiar with the broader
text and with the difference between the two. As a result there is no more reason for
holding the patentee to the literal terms of amended claim than there is for abolishing the
doctrine of equivalents altogether and holding every patentee to the literal terms of the
patent.
Id.
111. Id. The Supreme Court has “consistently applied the doctrine [of prosecution history
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The Supreme Court believed that the Federal Circuit, in implementing
the complete bar, was not mindful of the effect of disrupting settled rules
of law.112 In addition, the Court pointed out that in Warner-Jenkinson,
the Petitioner argued for a bright line test (essentially a complete bar) but
the Court rejected it as being too disruptive to the established rights of
active patent holders.113 The Court proceeded to reaffirm the rebutable
presumption holding from its Warner-Jenkinson decision.114
In addition to reaffirming Warner-Jenkinson, the Court added the
new presumption that the patentee bears the burden of showing that an
amendment does not surrender the particular equivalent in question.115
The Court reasoned that when patentees amend claims, they are aware
that prosecution history will be used to interpret claims and may result in
subject matter being surrendered.116 The Court, however, emphasized
estoppel] in a flexible way, not a rigid one.” Id. The court considers “what equivalents were
surrendered during the prosecution of the patent, rather than imposing a complete bar that resorts to
the very literalism the equivalents rule is designed to over come.” Id.
112. Id. at 739 (2002). The Supreme Court chided the Federal Circuit by indicating they
“ignored the guidance of Warner-Jenkinson, which instructed that courts must be cautious before
adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing community.” Festo V, 535
U.S. at 739. In the Court’s view “[t]he doctrine of equivalents and the rule of prosecution history
estoppel are settled law” and “the responsibility for changing them rests with Congress.” Id. The
Court further warned that “[f]undamental alterations in these rules risk destroying the legitimate
expectations of inventors in their property.” Id.
113. Id. The Supreme Court rejected the bright-line test stating “‘[t]o change so substantially
the rules of the game now could very well subvert the various balances the PTO sought to strike
when issuing the numerous patents which have not yet expired and which would be affected by our
decision.’” Id. (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 32 n.6
(1997)). The court also noted Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion in Warner: “The new
presumption, if applied woodenly, might in some instances unfairly discount the expectation of
patentee who had no notice at the time of patent prosecution that such a presumption would apply.”
Festo V, 535 U.S. at 739 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 41 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). In
addition, the Court noted that inventors may have chosen to appeal a rejection by the PTO rather
than amend the claim had they known they were conceding equivalents. Id.
114. Id. (stating its decision in Warner-Jenkinson “struck the appropriate balance by placing
the burden on the patentee to show that amendment was not for purposes of patentability”). Id. The
Court indicated that the holding does not mandate a complete bar; it is limited to the circumstance
where “no explanation is established.” Id. at 740. The Court continued, however, holding that
“when the court is unable to determine the purpose underlying a narrowing amendment . . . the court
should presume that the patentee surrendered all subject matter between the broader and narrower
language.” Id.
115. Festo V, 535 U.S. at 740 (noting that the source for this approach was the Amicus Curiae
Brief submitted by the United States). Id. (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Vacatur and Remand, Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
2001 WL 1025650 (2001) (No. 00-1543)). The Court stated that “[t]he patentee, as the author of
the claim language, may be expected to draft claims encompassing readily known equivalents” and
the “patentee’s decision to narrow his claims through amendment may be presumed to be a general
disclaimer of the territory between the original claim and the amended claim.” Id.
116. See id. at 741 (stating that the presumption “reflects the fact that the interpretation of the
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that the presumption is rebuttable, indicating that to overcome the
presumption that estoppel applies, “the patentee must show that at the
time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be
expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed
the alleged equivalent.”117 The Court also identifies when it would not
be reasonable to presume that the amendment surrenders a particular
equivalent.118 Specifically, the Court stated:
There are some cases, however, where the amendment cannot
reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular equivalent. The
equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time of the application;
the rationale underlying the amendment may bear no more than a
tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or there may be some
other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be
expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question. In
those cases the patentee can overcome the presumption that
prosecution history estoppel bars a finding of equivalence.119

Based on those holdings, the Supreme Court unanimously vacated
the Federal Circuit decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings.120
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court in Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co.121 created a new landscape for the future
application of the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history

patent must begin with its literal claims, and the prosecution history is relevant to construing those
claims).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 740-41. The Court uses the phrase “[t]here are some cases, however, where . . .”
when referring to how to rebut the presumption which does not explicitly indicate that there may be
additional ways to do so. Festo V, 535 U.S. at 740. Other commentators use various terminology to
refer to “these cases.” Id. See John M. Benassi & Kurt M. Kjelland, Still Not the Same as it Ever
Was . . . Proving Infringement After the Supreme Court’s Festo Decision, 721 PLI/PAT 253, 261
(2002) (“potential hooks”); Alan J. Ross, Foreseeability and the Doctrine of Equivalents: The
Supreme Court Changes the Rules Again, (article on file with author) (stating “types of equivalents
that will likely be found to be available” and “patentee must show”).
120. Festo V, 535 U.S. at 741-42. Festo Corp. conceded that the amendments were made for
reasons related to § 112, thus, were made for a “reason related to patentability” and therefore,
prosecution history estoppel applies. See id. at 741. However, the question of whether Festo Corp.
can rebut the presumption that prosecution history estoppel bars the particular equivalents in
questions is not evident on the record and must be determined by further proceedings. Id. at 741-42.
121. Festo V, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
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estoppel.122 The Court’s opinion reaffirmed the importance of the
doctrine of equivalents, emphasized the need for stability in the law, and
reiterated that “language is an imperfect fit for invention,” while
acknowledging the difficulty in balancing the goals of protection for
innovators and notice to the public.123 The Court rejected the Federal
Circuit’s ill-advised approach to create more certainty but chose not to
return to the traditional flexible bar rule.124 Instead, the Court drafted a
new approach, a rebutable presumption approach, that itself is filled with
uncertainty and bound to increase the complexity and cost of patent
prosecution and litigation in the future.125
A. Rejecting the Complete Bar Approach
From the onset, the response by commentators to the Federal
Circuit’s severe approach had, for the most part, been harsh.126
122. See Festo V, supra notes 102-10 (holding that any narrowing amendments made to satisfy
any requirement of the Patent Act will implicate prosecution history estoppel, rejecting the complete
bar approach, and creating the new rebutable presumption). See e.g., Leading Cases – Patent Act,
116 HARV. L. REV. 402, 408 (2002) (stating that “the particular presumption that the court adopted
in [Festo V] alters the estoppel inquiry in a manner certain to transform doctrine of equivalents
analysis”); Edward R. Reimes & Jeffrey G. Homrig, ‘Festo’ Established New Legal Framework,
San Francisco Daily Journal (October 9, 2002) (indicating that by rejecting the complete bar but
choosing to not revert back to the flexible approach, the Supreme Court has created a “new
framework: for evaluating the reach of prosecution history estoppel); R. Polk Wagner,
Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159,
161 (2002) (indicating that the Festo V decision will have ‘enormous implications” on modern
patent administration).
123. See supra Part III C.
124. See Festo V, 535 U.S. at 738 (disagreeing with the Federal Circuit’s decision to adopt the
complete bar); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. [Festo IV], 234 F.3d 558,
577 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining the complete bar provides greater certainty regarding patent
scope); GLADSTONE, supra note 5, at § 18:49 n.118 (indicating the Supreme Court did not return to
the flexible approach).
125. See infra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
126. See e.g., Anthony H. Azure, Note, Festo’s Effect on After-Arising Technology and the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1183 (2001) (stating that the Federal Circuit’s
complete bar runs contrary to both Warner-Jenkinson and to the policy that pioneering inventions
should be rewarded with broad claim coverage, as well as prejudicing patents in the unpredictable
arts); Faith S. Fillman, Doctrine of Equivalents: Is Festo the Right Decision for the Biomedical
Industry? 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 493, 542 (2002) (stating that the complete bar approach is damaging
to the goals of the patent system and the protection provided inventors); Raymond M. Galasso &
Elana H. Gloetzner, Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.: What Will the
Future Hold for Patentees? 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 591, 601 (2000) (concluding that the
doctrine of equivalents should only be limited by prosecution history estoppel in cases where an
amendment was made to a claim to overcome prior art and in such cases the range of equivalent
available would only be limited by that prior art); Jonathan M. Harris, Festo Has Decimated the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 65 TEX. B.J. 58, 59 (2002) (arguing that the complete bar may have
increased predictability but also dismantled the doctrine of equivalents and undercut the value of
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Likewise, after the Supreme Court granted certiorari, concern over the
Federal Circuit’s ruling sparked a number of organizations, corporations,
universities and individuals to file amicus curiae briefs urging reversal
of the Federal Circuit’s decision.127 The depth and breadth of arguments
against the complete bar rule strongly suggest that the Supreme Court
was correct in rejecting the Federal Circuit’s approach, which upset the
careful balance between the policy goals of the patent system.128 The
complete bar rule made the scope of equivalents more certain,129 but in
doing so, it undermined the established rights of current patent holders
and significantly weakened the protection that patents offer.130
much patented technology); Jacob S. Wharton, Festo and the Complete Bar: What’s Left of the
Doctrine of Equivalents? 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 281, 291 (2001) (arguing that the complete
bar was unnecessary and alternatives such as equitable application of the doctrine or a rebutable
presumption rule are better alternatives).
127. See Diane Elderkin, What Amici Curiae Are Saying About Festo, available at
http://www.woodcock.com/documents u/I0fK6xK2tO7tE8dF3bG0sH2vO6wD8o.html (last visited
February 1, 2003) (noting the majority of the amicus curiae briefs filed either supported the
petitioners, were in favor of vacatur and remand, or supported neither party). The Intellectual
Property Creators and Society of Amateur Scientists argued that the Federal Circuit’s Festo decision
shifted the costs of product development resulting in a decrease in scientific and technological
innovation. Id. 3M and various other major companies argued that:
[T]he complete bar rule, by altering established economic incentives in a manner that
favors derivative “improvements” at the expense of major advances that require
significant investments of time and money will inevitably deter investment in the
research and development that leads to many major advances, as well as to the numerous
“spillover” benefits that such efforts spawn.
Id. A group of leading universities and various non-profit institutions with a focus on research
argued that the Festo ruling will reduce their licensing income. Id. A number of briefs argued that
Federal Circuit’s ruling should not be applied retroactively. Id. The German pharmaceutical
company, Asta Medica, argued that “the Festo decision is inconsistent with the United States’
enunciated goal of global patent harmonization.” Id.
128. See Glen P. Belvis, An Analysis of the En Banc Decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. and the Doctrine of Equivalents, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 59, 60 (20012002) (stating that one policy of the patent system is “providing public notice as to what infringes
by requiring clear and distinct claims,” while the other policy focuses on the need to protect the
patent holder from infringers looking to avoid liability “by merely playing semantic games” or by
making insubstantial changes). Mr. Belvis further noted “one thing is clear: In Festo the public
notice function of claims has won out over the desire to protect an inventor from infringers and
unscrupulous copyists.” Id. at 97.
129. See Ross, supra note 119 (noting that the complete bar had “the effect of making patent
coverage far more predictable [since] there was no longer any need to analyze what the patentee had
surrendered as a result of an amendment or cancellation,” thus “it was much easier for a Judge to
determine when equivalents were available, or not available”).
130. See Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1045, 1062 (2001) (asserting that “[i]ndisputably, the absolute bar promotes the notice function of
patents” and “equally clear, however, that the absolute bar substantially compromise patent’s
protective function”); Azure, supra note 124, at 1174-75 (arguing that the strict approach to
prosecution history estoppel eliminate the protection the doctrine of equivalents offers against afterarising technology, which is the primary purpose of the doctrine); Benassi & Kjelland, supra note
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B. Unresolved Questions
The Supreme Court’s rejection of the Federal Circuit’s complete
bar rule has been viewed by many as a triumph for the patent system.131
Some commentators have, however, taken a far less enthusiastic view of
the Supreme Court’s new rebuttable presumption rule.132 Of concern is
that the Court’s approach appears to be a new, never before used
creation133 for which the Court provides scant guidance on its proper
application.134 As a result, a substantial number of unanswered
117, at 293 (indicating that the Supreme Court was concerned that the Federal Circuit dramatically
changed the legitimate expectations of inventors which considerably outweighed the added certainty
provided by the compete bar approach).
131. See Lawrence B. Ebert, Supreme Court Festo; Equivalents Still Limited, INTELL. PROP.
TODAY, July, 2002, at 10. (indicating that the popular press believe the Supreme Court’s Festo
decision to be a victory for inventors over copyists); See e.g. Ron Cahill, Festo Restores Right
Economic Incentives, U.S. Supreme Court Affirms Worth of Existing Patent, Companies, 168
N.J.L.J. 1225 (2002) (stating that the Supreme Court decision “restore[d] the right economic
incentives,” and will encourage competitions to invest in creating innovative advances in
technology rather than making insubstantial changes to patented technology in order to avoid
infringement); Jennifer Miller, Festo: Blessing to Patent Holders or Thorn in Their Sides?, 2002
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 17, 18 (2002) (indicating that one commentator believed that Festo
“reaffirmed a central tenet of patent law and restored the inherent value of more than a million
patents (citing Raymond Van Dyke and Steven Pederson, Decision of Note Festo: The Supreme
Court Preserves the Value of Patents, but Increases the Risk of Litigation, THE INTELL. PROP.
STRATEGIST, June 2002, at 1)); Sue Ann Mota, The Doctrine of Equivalents and Prosecution
History Estoppel: The Supreme Court Supports Flexibility Over Certainty in Patent Cases in Festo
v. SMC, 9 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 20 (2002) (concluding that the Supreme Court struck the
appropriate balance between innovation and certainty in Festo).
132. See e.g., Miller, supra note 131, at 24 (indicating that the Supreme Court’s Festo decision
altered the application of prosecution history estoppel by making it more frequent and the
application of the doctrine of equivalents by making it less difficult which has both helped and hurt
an innovator’s ability to attain a patent and protect it against infringement); Wagner, supra note 122
(arguing that prosecution history estoppel needs reform and the Supreme Court’s decision was
profoundly disappointing in that it ignored the opportunity to do so); Joseph Yang & Roxana H.
Yang, Prosecution History Estoppel After the Festo’s—Treacherous Shoals, Safe Harbors & Muddy
Waters, 725 PLI/PAT 9 (2002) (indicating that the Supreme Court’s addition of the unforeseeability
test has significantly muddied the water of the current state of law regarding prosecution history
estoppel).
133. See Lawrence B. Ebert, It’s a Strange, Strange World, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, October
2002, at 46 (indicating that the tests enunciated by the Court bear no citation to previous legal
authority and appear to have never been used). See also supra note 115 (indicating that the source
of the rebutable presumption was the amicus curiae brief from the United States); Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and Remand, Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 2001 WL 1025650 (2001) (No. 00-1543) (arguing that prosecution
history estoppel should not bar the doctrine of equivalents if the court finds that the equivalent is an
innovation that was not known to persons of ordinary skill in the art at the time the applicant
amended the claim or if it was not possible for one of ordinary skill in the art to draft a claim
amendment that literally encompassed the equivalent while disclaiming the surrendered subject
matter).
134. See Ebert, supra note 133 (stating that the Supreme Court provided no footnotes as to the
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questions make it difficult to understand Festo’s true impact.135
Since the Federal Circuit’s complete bar approach and the Court’s
new rule differs only in the ability to rebut the presumption, the main
question concerns the difficulty in doing so.136 Some commentators
origins of the three situations it articulated); Lawrence B. Ebert, Litera Scripta Manet?, INTELL.
PROP. TODAY, August 2002, at n.2 (indicating a commentator noted that the Court provided no
guidance on how to conduct the “tangential” inquiry); Paul Devinsky & Keith E. George, U.S.
Supreme
Court
Vacates
Federal
Circuit
Festo
Decision,
available
at
http://www.mwe.com/news/ots0502d.htm (last visited September 9, 2002) (indicating the Court
provided no guidance as to what might qualify as a “tangential relationship”).
135. See Reimes & Homrig, supra note 122 (indicating that some of the main practical
considerations raised by the Festo decision include: From what vantage point will the Festo analysis
be performed? Must the technology or the claim language be foreseeable? What is the proper timeframe for the analysis? Will extrinsic evidence be used and how? How will the “tangential relation”
principle be applied?). One commentator stated:
But questions remain. What exactly, does “foreseeability” or “inability to draft a claim”
mean? Do the terms “foreseeable” and “readily known” mean the same thing? Will
these issues be decided according to an objective or subjective standard? Will these
issues of foreseeability and ready knowledge be decided by a judge as a matter of law, or
a jury as a question of fact? What will be the role of expert testimony in the litigation of
theses questions? How will the Federal Circuit review these determinations when they
are made by district courts? How will the Festo presumptions apply, if at all, to
assertedly narrowing arguments made to the PTO in the course of obtaining a patent?
The answers to these and similar questions await continued development by the United
States Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit.
Scott W. Burt & Gregory A. Castanias, The Supreme Court’s Decision in Festo Corp.: An
Important New Development Regarding the Scope of Patent Protection, 10 METRO. CORP. COUNS.
(July 2002). Answers to some questions can already be found in some recent Federal Circuit cases.
Devinsky & George, supra note 134 (noting that an answer to the question “what kind of
amendments are narrowing?” can be found in recent Federal Circuit cases which hold that an
amendment can be narrowing when amending an original claim (citing Pall Corp. v. PTI
Technologies Inc., 259 F.3d 1383 (Fed Cir. 2001)), when including limitations for a dependent
claim in an independent claim (citing Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., 238 F.3d 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2001)), and when submitting a new, narrower claim (citing Mycogen Plant Science Inc. v.
Monsanto Co., on reh’g, 261 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). However, not all questions will have
answers so quickly. Steven J. Rizzi & Christopher E. Loh, Proving Infringement After Festo, 669
PLI/PAT 461 (2001) (stating that the impact of the Festo decision on infringement litigation and
patent prosecution will not likely be fully appreciated for years to come as the district courts and
Federal Circuit attempt to implement the Court’s guidance). But see Steven Anderson, Festo,
Finally: Doctrine of Equivalents Withstands Test, with Concessions, 12 CORP. LEGAL TIMES 62
(suggesting a clearer landscape regarding application of Festo will emerge by year’s end since a
backlog of doctrine of equivalents cases that been on hold, awaiting the Supreme Court’s ruling,
will resume immediately).
136. Compare Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. [Festo V], 535 U.S 722,
741 (2002) (stating “[w]hen the patentee has chosen to narrow a claim . . . the territory surrendered
is not an equivalent of the territory claimed”), with Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co. [Festo IV], 234 F.3d 558, 569 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding when an amendment creates
prosecution history estoppel with regard to a claim element there is no range of equivalents
available for the amended claim element). See Ebert, supra note 131 (stating “[t]he effective
difference between the Supreme Court holding and the Federal Circuit holding resides in the
identity of these ‘some cases’ and the ease by which the patentee can establish that the presence of
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believe that successfully rebutting the presumption will not be easy; thus
making the new test, in effect, identical to the complete bar rule.137 In
light of the Federal Circuit’s apparent distaste for the doctrine of
equivalents,138 another important question involves whether determining
if the presumption has successfully been rebutted will be treated as a
question of fact or one of law.139 In Warner-Jenkinson, the Court’s
one of these ‘cases’”).
137. See e.g., Rizzi & Loh, supra note 135, at 477 (noting that some commentators doubt that
patentees will be able to overcome the presumption that prosecution history estoppel bars the
doctrine of equivalent and thus believe the Court’s reversal of the complete bar is merely cosmetic);
Burt & Castanias, supra note 135, at 10 (indicating that it is not at all clear that the replacement of
the complete bar with the rebutable presumption will change the result in the main run of cases);
Young, infra note 138 (quoting Gregory Castanias from the firm of Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue
as warning that the Supreme Court merely “tweaked” the Federal Circuit’s complete bar approach);
Ebert, supra note 4 (suggesting that patentees will have difficulty in rebutting the presumption that
equivalents were not surrendered). Noting the language in the Supreme Court’s opinion, “this
presumption is not, then, just the complete bar by another name,” one commentator states “[i]f it
were clear that the Supreme Court’s decision were a major change from the en banc Federal Circuit
decision, such text would not have been needed.” Id. The Court’s language, “or there may be some
other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the
insubstantial substitute in question,” is a catch-all that will “likely not be helpful [in rebutting the
presumption], because the Court did not articulate a standard. Thus, such arguments may rarely, if
ever, overcome the presumption, and may serve only as a final plea for a desperate patentee.”
Benassi & Kjelland, supra note 117, at 263. “Patentees will be hard-pressed under Festo to argue
that one of ordinary skill in the art – a person presumed, under settled law, to have knowledge of all
technologies pertinent to the invention – could not have foreseen the use of an existing technology
to practice their invention.” Leading Cases – Patent Act, supra note 122.
138. See Gary Young, High Court Buttresses Patent Rule, Reversal Gives Boost to ‘Doctrine of
Equivalents’, NAT’L L.J., June 3, 2002, at A11 (quoting Professor John Duffy of William and Mary
School of Law as arguing that the Federal Circuit has general antipathy toward the doctrine of
equivalents and because the Supreme Court did not specify whether foreseeability was a judge or
jury question, the Federal Circuit may exploit this ambiguity to attack the doctrine of equivalents);
Belvis, supra note 128, at 98 (noting that the trend in the Federal Circuit over the last few years has
been to consistently narrow and rein in the doctrine of equivalents). Regarding implementation of
the Supreme Court’s rebutable presumption, one commentator stated:
[It] is now in the hands of what has become an increasingly unreceptive Federal Circuit
to patentees—a court that some commentators have characterized as doing everything in
its power to narrow patent claims and limit recoveries. Indeed, the Federal circuit may
still implement in effect, if not in name, a complete bar by simply setting the thresholds
so high that patentees will be unable to overcome the presumptions, except in rare cases.
Benassi & Kjelland, supra note 117 at 262.
139. See Donald S. Chisum, The Supreme Court’s Festo Decision: Implications for Patent
Claim Scope and Other Issues, at 19, available at http://web.lexis.com/xchange/practiceareas/
patent/chisumfesto.pdf (last visited January 31, 2003) (indicating that the United States Supreme
Court, in Festo V, does not directly say anything about whether it is a question of fact or a question
of law whether a patentee has successfully rebutted the presumption). The Court only stated that
“[o]n the record before us, we cannot say petitioner has rebutted the presumptions that estoppel
applies and that the equivalents at issue have been surrendered” and these matters “should be
determined in the first instance by further proceedings in the Court of Appeals or the District
Court.” Festo V, 535 U.S. at 741-42.
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guidance concerning reviewing jury verdicts based on the doctrine of
equivalent suggests that courts will treat the determination as a question
of law.140 This would be consistent with the Federal Circuit’s approach
to treating prosecution history estoppel as a matter of law.141 Therefore,
the Federal Circuit could echo Bernard Witkin’s famous quote, “on a
clear day, you can foresee forever,” by taking a broad view of
foreseeability.142 A broad view could result in patentees’ inability to
claim any equivalents, or, at most, only equivalents in a rapidly
developing field.143
The amicus curiae brief from the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers has been suggested as the source for the Court’s

140. See Ross, supra note 119 (proposing that the Supreme Court’s Warner-Jenkinson decision
suggests that determining foreseeability of equivalents will be a judicial determination made at
pretrial); Chisum, supra note 139, at 19 stating:
The Federal Circuit will likely continue to treat prosecution history estoppel as a
question of law just as it so treats the construction of patent claim language. Thus, it will
expect that parties to create a record in the district court. Likely also, district courts will
hold hearings on estoppel as part of, or in addition to, the Markman hearings held on
claim construction. The Federal Circuit will then review the district court’s decision de
novo.
Id. In footnote 8 of its Warner-Jenkinson decision, the Supreme Court stated:
Of course, the various legal limitations on the application of the doctrine of equivalents
are to be determined by the court, either on a pretrial motion for partial summary
judgment or on a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of evidence and
after the jury verdict . . . Thus, under the particular facts of a case, if prosecution history
estoppel would apply or if a theory of equivalence would entirely vitiate a particular
claim element, partial or complete judgment should be rendered by the court, as there
would be no further material issue for the jury to resolve.
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 (1997) (internal citation
omitted).
141. See Chisum, supra note 139, at 18 (stating “the Federal Circuit has consistently held that
prosecution history estoppel is a purely legal issue, resolvable by summary judgment, and
reviewable on appeal de novo (that is without deference to the trial court’s decision)”).
142. See Sturgeon v. Curnutt, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 498, 501 (1994).
143. See Benassi, supra note 117, at 262 stating:
If the Federal Circuit takes a broad view of an equivalent’s foreseeability, as it did in
defining “reasons related to patentability,” then it is likely that an unforeseeable
equivalent will be rare, and may only apply to an “after-arising equivalent” to a truly
pioneering invention. And under this scenario, the patentee will be in the horns of a
dilemma, because if the alleged equivalent was “unforeseeable,” then there is a
substantial risk that the equivalent may not meet the function/way/result test.
Id. Graver’s tripartite test requires that an alleged equivalent perform substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result. See Graver Tank, supra note 56.
Thus an alleged equivalent that functions in an unforeseeable way, may not satisfy this test.
Benassi, supra note 117, at 262. After-arising technology refers to equivalents that were not known
when the patent was issued. Azure, supra note 30, at 1163. Pioneer inventions refer to endeavors
in a new field and are often infringed by after-arising technology. Id. Thus pioneer inventions rely
on the doctrine of equivalents for protection, as do inventions in unpredictable arts. Id.
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use of foreseeability.144 The brief, however, proposed a ‘foreseeable
bar’ that focused on the foreseeability of the effect of an amendment,
which differs somewhat from the foreseeable equivalent test specified in
Festo.145 A discussion of foreseeability that is closer to the Festo test
can be found in two recent Federal Circuit opinions.146
While the patent profession was waiting for the Supreme Court to
rule in Festo, foreseeability of equivalents were discussed in two
concurring opinions in the Federal Circuit case Johnson & Johnston
Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Service Co.147 Judge Rader, joined by Chief Judge
Mayer, argued that the doctrine of equivalents should not be applied to
capture any foreseeable equivalent.148 He further argued that the Federal

144. See Brief of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers—United States of
America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 2001 WL 1025309 (2001) (No. 00-1543) (arguing that the doctrine of
equivalents should not be barred by prosecution history estoppel unless the limiting effect of the
amended language with respect to the accused device would have been foreseeable at the time of the
amendment); Ebert, supra note 133, at 46 n.3 (“Given that the IEEE test is about foreseeability of
the effect of the amendment and the Supreme Court test, as written , and as construed by district
courts, is about the foreseeability of the proposed equivalent, it might seem that the U.S. Supreme
Court did not adopt the proposed IEEE test.”). See also Conigliaro, supra note 130 (reiterating the
same position taken in the amicus curiae brief for the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers).
145. Ebert, supra note 133, at n.6 (noting that the ‘foreseeable bar’ in the Supreme Court’s
opinion focuses on whether or not the element related to the amendment was an unforeseeable
equivalent, the bar in the Institute of IEEE brief focuses on the foreseeability of the effect of the
amendment, and the bar as articulated by John W. Steadmen, a VP of IEEE, focuses on the
infringing device as a whole and its foreseeability at the time of application).
146. Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Service Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir 2002);
Sage Prods. Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. Cir 1997).
147. Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1046 (Fed. Cir 2002). Johnson & Johnston involved a
patent that relates to the manufacture of printed circuit boards. Id. at 1048. The invention
addressed the problem of damaging or contaminating, by handling, the thin sheets of copper foil
used in the production of the circuit boards. Id. at 1049. The patent specification called for use of a
substrate made, preferably, of aluminum but other metals such as stainless steel could be used as
well. Id. at 1050. The patent claim, however, mentioned only aluminum. Id. R. E. Service Co.
subsequently employed an identical process except they used a steel substrate instead of aluminum.
Id. Johnson & Johnston sued for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Id. The Federal
Circuit held that Johnson & Johnston could not claim equivalents because it disclosed the steel
structure in the patent but did not claim it; thus, that structure was deemed to be dedicated to the
public. Id. at 1055.
148. Id. at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring). Judge Rader stated “the doctrine of equivalents does
not capture subject matter that the patent drafter reasonably could have foreseen during the
application process and included in the claims.” Id. This rule would “help reconcile the preeminent
notice function of patent claims with the protective function of the doctrine of equivalents.” Id.
The principle would “enhance[ ] the notice function of claims by making them the sole definition of
invention scope in all foreseeable circumstance” as well as “protect[ing] patentees against copyists
who employ insubstantial variations to expropriate the claimed invention in some unforeseeable
circumstance. Id.
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Circuit had previously held as much in Sage Products Inc. v. Devon
Industries., Inc.149 The discussion of foreseeability in Festo was limited
to the context of narrowing amendments which produce prosecution
history estoppel; however, Judge Rader and Chief Judge Mayer’s view
expands the limiting effect of foreseeability to all applications of the
doctrine of equivalents.150
Commenting on Judge Rader’s opinion, Judge Lourie, in his
concurring opinion, argued that the concept of using foreseeability to
limit the application of the doctrine of equivalents creates conflicts with
conventional patent law ideas and adds additional complexity to an
already complex area of the law.151 Commentators on the Supreme

149. Id. at 1057 (citing Sage Prods. Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. Cir 1997)).
In Sage Products, the parties cross-sued for infringement of each others patents relating to
containers for disposing of hazardous medical waste such as hypodermic needles. Sage Prods., 126
F.3d at 1422. The Federal Circuit affirmed the holding that neither party infringed, either literally
or under the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 1421. In Judge Rader’s view, the court in Sage “barred
application of the doctrine of equivalents ‘for this foreseeable alteration of the claim structure.”‘
Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1058. In addition, the Sage court noted that unforeseeable subject
matter may include “subject matter arising from a ‘subsequent change in the state of the art such as
later developed technology’ . . . or subject matter cloaked by the ‘subtlety of language or complexity
of the technology.”‘ Id. (quoting Sage Prods., 126 F.3d at 1425). Noting that the foreseeability
rule may increase costs, the Sage court stated:
This court recognizes that such reasoning places a premium on forethought in patent
drafting. Indeed this premium may lead to higher costs of patent prosecution. However,
the alternative rule—allowing broad play for the doctrine of equivalents to encompass
foreseeable variations, not just of a claim element, but of a patent claim also leads to
higher costs. Society at large would bear these latter costs in the form of virtual
foreclosure of competitive activity within the penumbra of each issued patent claim.
Because the doctrine of equivalents blurs the line of demarcation between infringing and
non-infringing activity, it creates a zone of uncertainty, into which competitors tread
only at their peril . . . Given a choice of imposing the higher costs of careful prosecution
on patentees, or imposing the costs of foreclosed business activity on the public at large,
this court believes the costs are properly imposed on the group best positioned to
determine whether or not a particular invention warrants investment at a higher level,
that is the patentees.
Sage Prods., 126 F.3d at 1425 (internal citation omitted). But see Leading Cases – Patent Act,
supra note 122, at 411 (suggesting that the Federal Circuit has retreated from its holding in Sage,
preferring to cite it for the general proposition that the public is entitled to rely on clear structural
claim limitations).
150. Compare Festo V, 535 U.S. at 741 (holding that “the patentee can overcome the
presumption that prosecution history estoppel bars a finding of equivalents” if “the equivalent is
unforeseeable at the time of the application”) with Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J.,
concurring) (arguing that “the doctrine of equivalents does not capture subject matter that the patent
drafter reasonably could have foreseen during the application process and included in the claims”).
151. Id. at 1063 (Lourie, J., concurring). Judge Lourie disagreed that foreseeability would
simplify equivalence issues. Id. The determination of what one skilled in the art would foresee
would likely involve the introduction of expert evidence. Id. In addition, Judge Lourie believed
that foreseeability is similar to the obviousness test that is already a part of patent law. Id.
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Court’s use of foreseeability in Festo have indicated similar concerns.
As Judge Lourie aptly stated in his concurrence:
It seems counterintuitive for a patentee to have to assert that an
accused device was [unforeseeable] or for the accused to have to assert
that it was [foreseeable]. A patentee seeking to establish equivalence
wants to show that the accused is merely making a minor variation of
his invention, a [foreseeable] one, not a[n] [unforeseeable]
improvement. One accused of infringement wants to show that he has
made an important advance, not that he is a copier, and that his device
was [foreseeable] over the patented invention . . . .152

Though Judge Rader’s opinion that the Federal Circuit’s holding in
Sage Products is settled law is likely not accurate; when taken together
with Johnson & Johnston, they show the Federal Circuit’s desire to limit
use of the doctrine of equivalents.153
Another unanswered question from the Court’s decision concerns
the stage at which the foreseeability of an equivalent should be tested.154
In separate sections of the opinion, the Court mentions both “at the time
of the amendment” and “at the time of the application.”155
Commentators disagree about the most appropriate time to apply the
foreseeability test.156 The timeframe is important since an unforeseeable
152. Id. See also Festo V, 535 U.S. at 722. See also Alan J. Ross, supra note 140 (stating the
arguments that the parties in litigation will have to make are counterintuitive); Benassi & Kjelland,
supra note 119, at 295 (stating “[s]omewhat counterintuitive, the more trivial the modification, the
more likely it will be judged ‘foreseeable,’ the more likely that the presumption will not be rebutted,
and prosecution history estoppel will apply”).
153. See supra note 149. If Sage Products were settled law, then the Supreme Court in Festo
would not have had to indicate that unforeseeable equivalents could rebut the presumption since the
doctrine of equivalents would not apply to foreseeable equivalents in the first place. See supra note
150.
154. See Chisum, supra note 139, at 13 (stating that there is ambiguity in the Court’s language
for it mentions both “time of amendment” and time of application”).
155. Compare Festo V, 535 U.S. at 738 (stating “there is no reason why a narrowing
amendment should be deemed to relinquish equivalents unforeseeable at the time of the
amendment . . . .”) (emphasis added), with id. at 740 (stating “[t]he equivalent may have been
unforeseeable at the time of the application”) (emphasis added).
156. See Yang, supra note 132, at 34 (holding that foreseeability is to be tested at the time of
amendment); Steven J. Rizzi & Jessica L. Banger, Litigating Infringement Under the Doctrine of
Equivalents After Festo, 721 PLI/PAT 345, 365-66 (2002) (stating that “[g]iven that the estoppel
arises from the act of amending the claims, logically this is the proper time frame for the
foreseeability inquiry”). But see Chisum, supra note 139, at 13 stating:
A “time of application” rule, that is, the effective filing date, would be consistent with
the basic patent law principles. Generally, a patent application “speaks” as of its filing
date. A patent applicant cannot add “new matter” by amendment. New matter may be
added by filing of a continuation-in-part application, but any claims dependent on the
new matter will not be entitled to the benefit of the new filing date, Federal Circuit case
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equivalent at the time of application can become foreseeable before an
amendment.157 Testing foreseeability at the time of amendment requires
the patentee to keep a diligent eye on developing technology, and it may
not be consistent with the Court’s emphasis on a drafter’s ability to
choose his or her own words.158
C. Implications of the New Rule
The implications of the Festo decision on the cost and complexity
of patent law and practice is not favorable for the patentee.159 As with
the complete bar approach, patentees have incentives to avoid
amendments and, in addition, now have the burden of including every
foreseeable equivalent in the patent application.160 As a result, the cost
law indicates that the date of construing claims language is presumed to be the filing
date.
Id. (citing Schereing Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222. F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
157. See Chisum, supra note 139, at 13 stating:
There could well be a major difference between what was “foreseeable” on the
application date and on the amendment date. An application may have been filed, for
example, on July 1, 1999, and the amendment entered years later, for example, on July 1,
2002. Often more will be “foreseeable” at the later date because of progress in the
technology and the marketplace.
Id.; Yang, supra note 132, at 34 (indicating a time of amendment test could result in a patentee
losing equivalent coverage inappropriately if a competitor initiates some publicly discoverable
activity after the patentee’s filing date, but prior to when the patentee amendment date); Rizzi &
Banger, supra note 156, at 365 (suggesting that applying the foreseeability test at the time of
amendment imposes a heavy burden and may require submission of extrinsic evidence to prove
unforeseeability under some objective standard); Ross, supra note 140 (stating that time between
filing the application and when the patent prosecutor would respond to the first office action could
be as long as six months which for a quickly evolving technology could result in significant
changes).
158. See Festo V, 535 U.S. at 722 (placing the burden on the patentee, as “author of the claim
language,” to draft claims covering “readily known equivalents”); Miller, supra note 131, at 22,
stating:
The requirement of unforeseeability at the time of amendment raises an interesting
question. When a patentee is making an amendment to a claim for whatever reason, he
or she is limited to the language in the specification. What does he or she do then if an
equivalent invention was not foreseeable at the time the specification was drafted, and
thus the language for incorporating it is not present in the specification, but it has since
become foreseeable? Is it really accurate for the Supreme Court to say that “the
patentee, as author of the claim language, may be expected to draft claims encompassing
readily known equivalents” when patentees do not actually have the whole of the English
language at their disposal?
Id.
159. See Festo V, 535 U.S. at 722; see Rizzi & Banger, supra note 156, at 369 (stating that the
precautions practitioners will take in light of Festo “will most likely result in longer patent
applications with more claims, and more protracted proceedings before the PTO, thus increasing the
cost of obtaining patents”).
160. See Rizzi & Banger, supra note 156, at 368 (stating that following the Federal Circuit’s
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to the patentee will increase as patent lawyers must consider drafting
narrow claims, drafting longer claims to cover all foreseeable
equivalents, and spending more time researching the technology and fine
tuning language.161
In addition, to avoid amendments that raise prosecution history
estoppel, patentees will likely appeal more rejections.162 The likely
adjustments that patent practitioners make will place additional work on
an already overburdened United States Patent & Trademark Office.163
Additionally, the court system will likely see an increase in litigation as
practitioners test the new Festo rules—seeking an understanding of how
courts will apply them.164 Finally, during litigation, the inquiries into
whether the patentee has rebutted the presumption will likely be
complex and fact-intensive and include the submission of extrinsic
Festo decision, “patent prosecutors resorted to drafting narrow claims so as to avoid amending them
during prosecution and risking a complete bar” and in addition are now required to “include claims
covering every embodiment and variant of the invention disclosed in the application”).
161. See Miller, supra note 131, at 19 stating:
Patent attorneys have the new burden of drafting claims that incorporate every
foreseeable alteration known at that time. This could mean increasing the number of
claims tremendously in order to incorporate every possible angle, as well as increasing
the amount of time spent researching prior art and the state of the inventive art at the
time of filing. Because the presumption will be against the patentee anytime he or she
amends a claim, attorneys are likely to spend more time drafting the original claims and
to include more and narrower claims in order to ensure that they will be patentable
without amending.
Id.; Rizzi & Banger, supra note 156, at 368 (indicating that though the practitioner may now draft
broader claims than when the complete bar was in force, the uncertainty surrounding the Supreme
Court’s decision will likely result in practitioners “to tread carefully” when drafting claims varying
in scope); Anderson, supra note 135, at 62 (suggesting that patent applications will become longer
and more complex as a result of amendments being disfavored and patent counsel seeking to predict
more potential uses for the patent).
162. See Rizzi & Banger, supra note 156, at 368 (explaining that the uncertainty surrounding
Festo and the deleterious effect of an amendment to a claim will likely result in practitioners
appealing more rejections).
163. See Anderson, supra note 135, at 62 (asserting that until Festo’s ruling becomes clearer, it
will “place more pressure on an overburdened U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, which will
undoubtedly affect the speed and quality of examination”); Rizzi & Banger, supra note 156, at 369
(expecting more protracted proceedings before the Untied States Patent and Trademark Office).
Festo may result in many possible changes including more contested prosecution, more appeals to
the Board of Appeal and Court, greater resistance to examiner’s amendments, more voluminous
replies to Office actions, more requests for reissue, reexamination, and suspension of action,
increased application complexity, more double patenting issues, and more examiner interviews.
Stephen G. Kunin, Effects of Festo Decision on USPTO Operations, 725 PLI/PAT 397 (2002)
(indicating there is anecdotal evidence that Festo has caused an increase in the volume of claims but
the impact is unclear).
164. See Miller, supra note 131, at 19 (asserting that “[a]nother additional cost could arise
from an increase in litigation due to the Supreme Court’s new guidelines that will need to be tested
before they become completely clear.”)
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evidence to determine, for example, what is foreseeable to “a person
skilled in the art.”165
It is clear that complexity and cost of prosecution may increase, but
commentators disagree on who benefits most from Festo.166 Though it
may not be clear who benefits from this new test, it is likely that courts
will struggle with consistently applying it.167 Ironically, consistency was
the primary concern the Federal Circuit cited for its initial decision to
discard the flexible bar approach.168
165. Festo V, 535 U.S. at 741 (asserting that the standard for rebutting is that “one skilled in
the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim . . .”). See Rizzi & Banger, supra
note 156, at 363 stating:
Moreover, it will likely be up to the Federal Circuit to establish a specific test for
“foreseeability’ that could add a whole new layer of complexity to the doctrine of
equivalents analysis, including the inevitable submission of expert testimony in the issue.
Proving foreseeability of an equivalents or an amendment’s tangential relationship to an
equivalent will most likely be complicated and fact-intensive endeavors . . . Thus, one
could envision a process akin to claim construction, where the court may consider
extrinsic evidence of, e.g. the foreseeability to one of skill in the art of a particular
equivalent, in connection with a determination as a matter of law of the issue of
prosecution history estoppel. Unlike claim construction, however, which is determined
as a matter of law without reference to the accused device, the Supreme Court’s decision
requires that the analysis be performed with reference to the alleged equivalent at issue,
thus making it difficult if not impossible to avoid consideration of factual issues
concerning the accused product or process.
Id. But see James Pooley & Marc David Peters, Proof of Equivalence After Festo: The Impact of
Foresight, 725 PLI/PAT 101, 109-10 (2002) (suggesting that it may be possible for a court to decide
the foreseeability of equivalents issue solely as a matter of law (without factual inquiry) based on
the connection between foreseeability and the predictability of the technology).
166. See e.g., Burt & Castanias, supra note 135, at 10 (suggesting that the most likely
beneficiaries of Festo presumption will be patent owners in industries that experience rapid
technological advances such as biotechnology, computer software, telecommunications, and
aerospace); Miller, supra note 131, at 18 (indicating that smaller companies are likely to benefit
more from the Festo presumption).
167. See Ebert, supra note 133, at 46 (noting a district court has acknowledged confusion
among courts over the foreseeability issue in Festo). The court stated:
The court is aware that several recent opinions address the applicability of prosecution
history estoppel to the ‘798 patent. In Glaxo Wellcome v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc . . . .
[T]he Southern District of New York concluded that prosecution history estoppel does
not apply, finding a triable issue of fact as to the foreseeability of HPC as a sustainedrelease agent. This court does not find the same ambiguity in the record before it. The
court respectfully disagrees with that decision.
Id. (quoting Glaxo v. Impax, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1089 N.D. Cal. 2002).
168. See Festo IV, 234 F.3d at 574-75. The court stated that
A problem with the flexible bar approach is that it is virtually impossible to predict
before the decision on appeal where the line of surrender is drawn. The patentee would
draw the line just at or slightly short of the prior art, leaving a wide range of equivalents
untouched by prosecution history estoppel. The accused infringer, however, would draw
the line close to the literal terms of the claims, leaving little or no range of equivalents.
These considerations, we think, contribute to the difficulty under the flexible bar
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D. An Alternative Approach
In light of the increase in cost and complexity likely to result from
the Court’s new rule, one wonders if an alternative approach would have
Some
served patent law and the patent community better.169
commentators have advocated an approach that focuses on the
foreseeable effect of an amendment rather than on the foreseeability of
an equivalent or the rationale underlying the amendment.170 Such an
approach places the determination of whether prosecution history should
apply on how the amendment would be perceived by someone reading it,
rather than on the claim drafting process.171
Placing the emphasis on the foreseeable effect of the amendment is
consistent with the policy concerns underlying prosecution history
estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents.172 In addition, it comports with
the notice function because it focuses on how the hypothetical third

approach in predicting with any degree of certainty the scope of surrender that will be
found when prosecution history estoppel applies.
Id. at 575.
169. See supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
170. See Conigliaro, supra note 130, at 1048 (advocating a “foreseeable bar” that apply
estoppel if the limiting effect of the language of the amendment with respect to the accused device
would have been foreseeable to a reasonable person skilled in the art at the time of amendment);
Leading Cases – Patent Act, supra note 122, at 409 (suggesting the Court could have adopted a rule
where “a patentee may rebut the new presumption of estoppel only by showing that no reasonable
competitor could have understood the prosecution history to surrender the equivalent at issue).
171. Id. (asserting that “the settled test for prosecution history estoppel” is “whether a
competitor, reading the prosecution history, would reasonably have believed that the patentee
surrendered that relevant subject matter” (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448,
1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998) and Mark I Mktg. Corp. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 66 F.3d 285, 291
(Fed. Cir. 1995)). Festo shifts the focus from the established “reasonable competitor” test to the ex
ante reasonableness of the claim drafting process. Leading Cases – Patent Act, supra note 122, at
408-09. “The ‘reasonable competitor’ test traces back at least to Prodyne Enterprises, Inc. v. Julie
Promerantz, Inc., 743 F.2d 1581, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1984), which found estoppel where ‘a competitor
should reasonably be entitled to believe’ that it does not infringe the amended claim.” Leading
Cases – Patent Act, supra note 122, at 408 n.65. “The relevant inquiry [regarding application
prosecution history estoppel] is whether a competitor would reasonably believe that the applicant
had surrendered the relevant subject matter” Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1457. “The standard for
determining whether particular subject matter was relinquished is an objective one that depends on
what a competitor reasonably would conclude from the patent’s prosecution history.” Mark I Mktg.,
66 F.3d at 291.
172. See Conigliaro, supra note 130, at 1069. Application of the foreseeable bar is eminently
fair and consistent with concept of the notice function of claims and prosecution history because it
bars use of the doctrine of equivalents when a reasonable person skilled in the art would foresee the
limiting effect of the amendment. Id. The foreseeable bar also allows use of the doctrine of
equivalents when “subtlety of language or complexity of the technology, [or a] subsequent changing
in the state of the art, such as later-developed technology” would make foreclosing the use of
equivalents an unfair deprivation of patent protection. Id.
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person, one skilled in the art, foresees the effect of the amendment.173 It
is also consistent with the idea that language is an imperfect fit for
invention in that “subtlety of language or complexity of technology”
impacts the foreseeability of the limiting effect.174 Similar to the tests in
Festo, looking at the foreseeable effect of the amendment utilizes the
initial presumption and would only alter how the presumption is
rebutted.175 This approach addresses some of the evils of both the
flexible bar approach and the complete bar approach176 and avoids some
of the confusion and unfavorable consequences that the cases for
rebutting the presumption in Festo present.177
First, such an approach does not require the patentee incorporate
every foreseeable equivalent into the application as the test in Festo
does.178 In addition, there is less concern with technology developing
between the time of application and time of amendment since the focus
is the foreseeability of the limiting effect of the amendment, not the
equivalent itself.179 Finally, when the focus is on the foreseeable effect
of the limitation, the counterintuitive argument indicated by Judge
Lourie’s concurrence in Sage Products no longer has to be made.180
173. See Conigliaro, supra note 130, at 1048 (indicating the foreseeable bar “presents the best
means for effectuating patents’ protective and notice functions to promote all forms of progress,
including both pioneering inventions and technological improvements”).
174. See Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(referring to the invention as a simple structure and that the patent author would not have been
confused by “subtleties in language or complexity in technology); Festo V, 535 U.S. at 737 (stating
“the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent
application.”). The Court further stated
After amendment, as before, language remains an imperfect fit for invention . . . As a
result, there is no more reason for holding the patentee to the literal terms of an amended
claim that there is for abolishing the doctrine altogether and holding every patentee to
the literal terms of the patent.
Id. at 738.
175. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
176. See Conigliaro, supra note 130, at 1069. The foreseeable bar overcomes the substantial
failings of the absolute bar such as its encouragement of competitors to make trivial changes to
avoid the patent and discouragement of the creation of pioneering innovations. Id. at 1069-70.
Because the foreseeable bar allows use of the doctrine of equivalents, is does not disproportionately
discourage pioneering innovation or encourage trivial copying. Id. at 1070 The foreseeable bar
permits patent protection against insubstantial changes and exploitation of subtleties of language or
complexity of technology. Id.
177. See supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. The concerns with patent counsel needing to
draft longer claims, spend more time researching the technology, and fine tuning the language are
results from needing to cover all foreseeable equivalents in the claim. See Festo V, 535 U.S. at 741.
179. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
180. Sage Prods., 126 F.3d at 1420. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. Arguing that
a particular equivalent is foreseeable or not is not the issue under an approach focused on the
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V. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel have
long been a part of patent law in the United States.181 Throughout their
existence, courts have struggled trying to strike appropriate balance
between the doctrines and their underlying policy goals.182 The Supreme
Court recently reaffirmed the importance of both doctrines and solidified
their existence as settled law.183 In Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,184 Festo Corporation sought to invoke the
doctrine of equivalents against an alleged infringer.185 Instead of
reaching a verdict on the merits, the Court significantly changed the law
a second time and remanded the case for further consideration.186
In Festo, the United States Supreme Court was faced with a drastic
change in the law dictated by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, who reasoned that this charge would lead to more certainty to
the scope of claims.187 The Supreme Court declined to support the
Federal Circuit’s severe approach but appeared to have some sympathy
for the Federal Circuit’s position.188 Instead of choosing to revert back
to the traditional flexible approach, the Supreme Court sought a middle
ground and drafted a novel rule—the rebutable presumption approach.189
As it sought to improve the balance between patent policy goals
over that offered by the complete bar and the flexible bar rules,190 the
Supreme Court changed the face of patent law.191 The Court, however,
foreseeable effect of a limitation. Id.
181. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 21-39 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
184. Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. [Festo V], 535 U.S. 722
(2002).
185. See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 102-20 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 102-20 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 114-16, 128-31, and accompanying text.
190. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.[Festo IV], 234 F.3d 558 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (asserting that the flexible bar approach did not provide adequate notice to the public
which resulting in overbroad patent protection that became unworkable); Id. at 598 (Michel, J.,
concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part) (disagreeing with the complete bar approach because it
directly contradicts a U.S. Supreme Court holding, it undermines the legal standards the Supreme
Court articulated in seven other cases, it effectively strips most patentees of their rights to asset
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, and it creates easy exploitation for would-be
copyists).
191. See supra note 120 and accompanying text; Chisum, supra note 139, at 19 (indicating that
though prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents are the focal areas of the Festo
opinion, the opinion “rests on important general themes that will influence the development and
application of patent law in the future” and touch areas such as limiting per se rules, disruptive rule
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stopped short—leaving the new rule ill-defined and numerous issues
unresolved.192 The initial impact of the Supreme Court’s decision
appears to be increased cost, complexity, and uncertainty in patent
prosecution and litigation.193 One wonders if an alternative rule that
focuses on the foreseeable effect of an amendment would alleviate some
of the concerns.194 The future of the doctrine of equivalence appears to
be back in the hands of the Federal Circuit as it must flesh out the
guidance given by the Supreme Court.195 That fact should leave
proponents of the doctrine of equivalents with little solace, as trends
within the Federal Circuit suggest the doctrine is not welcome.196
Mark R. Hull

changes, the dedication rule, written description, “on sale” bar, and prosecution laches).
192. See supra notes 132-58 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 169-80 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 138 and accompanying text.
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